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NEAR EAST/NORTH AFRICA REPORT

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CONSEQUENCES OF GAFSA EXPLORED

Paris LE MOIS EN AFRIQUE in French Apr-May 80 pp 97-103

[Article by Moncef S. Badday]

[Text] The decade-long tug-of-war between President Bourguiba and Colonel Qadhdhafi certainly did not find its bloody denouement in Gafsa. Responsibility for the attack on the mining city was claimed by an opposition Tunisian organization; however, it is attributed to the Libyans by the Destourian government. Doubtless the attack is the point of departure for a more extensive development the implications of which for the middle-term could be considerable. With the Algerian-Moroccan conflict on the subject of the Western Sahara and the disputes between Tunisia and Libya, we are witnessing a redistribution of the geopolitical configuration in the Maghreb.

Let us note at the outset that the Tunisian authorities in Gafsa did everything they could to conceal the Algerian role in this sad affair and that the attack on the city cannot be disassociated from the social blockage situation resulting from the tragic events of February 1978.¹ The fact that this tragic development took place in Gafsa, the capital of a region which saw the birth of Tunisian trade unionism, is nothing more than confirmation of this evidence. Libyan participation insofar as can be clearly determined because certain aspects of the affair have remained undisclosed should be examined in the light of the strange relations between the two countries since the 1 September 1969 coup d'etat which carried Col Mu'ammarr Qadhdhafi into power. When one moves without transition from vengeful anathema to effusiveness and when one declares that problems have been resolved in less time than it took to pose them, we can expect one day or another that the dispute will reappear in full bloom. In 10 years, the Tunisians and Libyans have insulted one another to the point that they are embarrassed. To the at times inopportune solicitations and threatening orders from the Libyan colonel the Tunisian leaders have always responded with an attitude of temporization, alternating polite indifference, indignation not followed by action and at times ostentatious fraternization² without an in-depth examination of the problems.

The Marriage of Water and Fire

In this duel between two regimes which in all respects are ideologically separated, the Libyan Jamahiriyyah continues to be on the credit side.³ Some 100,000 Tunisians work there, and the Libyan economy absorbs a certain number of Tunisian agricultural products formerly exported to countries in the European Common Market. This perhaps explains that.

In such a context, one can well be amazed that in Djerba President Bourguiba agreed to sign an agreement for the merger of Tunisia and Libya. The enormous publicity given by Libya to this "victory of Arabism" was matched by the disappointment and bitterness of Colonel Qadhafi when the Tunisian leaders the day after reversed what they had agreed to the night before. That blunder by a man who is regarded as a master of the political game was for a long time to prejudice Tunisian-Libyan relations and to place Tunisia in a debtor position vis-a-vis its neighbor. One French newspaper was never so exuberant as it was when it wrote about the "marriage of water and fire" in reference to this ludicrous merger effort. As a matter of fact, the Tunisians put out a simple statement of principle;⁴ and the Libyans, happy at being able to have a moral ace in the hole, cried betrayal and continue to call for an ectoplasmic "Islamic Arab Republic." For Colonel Qadhafi, who gives his political action a clearly messianic coloration and claims to be the heir of Jamal ab-al-Nasir, the Tunisian Government was guilty of a serious betrayal. The application of the Djerba agreement will remain one of his primary objectives. This observation makes it apparent that Tunisia is no longer a foreign country for Tripoli and that Libyan action cannot, therefore, be hampered there! We note that at the formal level, the Tunisians have made certain concessions since the two countries do not exchange ambassadors; however, a "high representative" of each of the two countries is posted in Tunis and Tripoli.

An Overcast Sky

It should be recognized that the president of the republic, reputed to be a skillful maneuverer, does not seem to have grasped the psychology of his young opponent. A man whose political action is based upon the crystallization of Tunisian national feeling has seriously misunderstood the intentions of a man who regularly makes statements about the absurdity of borders between Arab countries. In fact, Qadhafi found himself face-to-face with the man who fought Nasir's pan-Arabism his entire life and has always given precedence to the idea of a Tunisian nation over an Arab nationalism which for him is a foreign concept. History will perhaps say which of them wanted to convert or dupe the other, since in private the two leaders say that they have mutual respect for one another.⁵ The bete noire for the Libyans continues to be Hedi Nouira, Tunisian prime minister, to whom they attribute the defeat of the merger. It is nonetheless remarkable that the media of Tripoli whose excesses are no longer in question did not personally attack the "Supreme Combatant," electing instead to assail the "mad dogs which surround and deceive him."

If, therefore, Gafsa exploded under an already overcast sky it did nonetheless contribute to the traumatization of the Tunisians who by temperament are opposed to this kind of action. Some members of the Tunisian opposition did it is true place themselves at the service of the Libyans; however, it is obvious that the latter made as much use of Qadhdhafi as he did of them. Viewed from this angle, the Gafsa attack is purely an internal Tunisian affair. The hypothesis advanced by the Tunisian authorities according to which the "communards" of Gafsa reportedly called for the help of the Libyan army does not stand up under serious analysis. It would be an insult to the Tunisians to think that they would have tolerated the presence of a foreign army, if it were Libyan. It is not in this raw and harsh region in south Tunisia whose inhabitants distinguished themselves valiantly against the special units of the French army during the fight for independence that one would expect to find despicable "collabos" in the pay of a foreign power. In Colonel Qadhdhafi's mind, the operation was to have been the first step in a political destabilization process initiated by the installation of a guerrilla force as was done during the period of the anticolonial struggle, with Libya committing itself to serving as a sanctuary. On the other hand, the rapid French intervention, even if, as one affirms with his hand on his heart in Paris and Tunis, it was limited to the loan of two "Transall" airplanes and a dozen helicopters, appeared to be a sign of weakness and for a moment rendered credible the pompous predictions of Radio Tripoli whose "news reports" were characterized by the most extreme and delirious fantasy. The preposterous statements of the Libyan radio which reported fighting in the streets of Tunis between French paratroopers and Tunisian revolutionaries contributed to accrediting the official Tunisian position more than duly-proven facts could have done.

Friendly Quid Pro Quo

It is nonetheless true that Algeria, alarmed by the swiftness of the French intervention forthrightly made known its reprobation and concern. This leads one to believe that this country, if not strictly speaking involved in the "coup," would have looked upon a change in the regime on its eastern border without displeasure. The in camera hearing ordered by the president of the State Security Court when Ahmed Merghenni, the principal defendant, named Algerian officers, makes it evident that the Tunis government does not wish to fight on two fronts. The Algerian role in "operation Gafsa" is to be established; however, that role is obvious. And there is no doubt that a kind of friendly quid pro quo took place between Algerians and Tunisians. The latter by overlooking in a way the possible complicities of certain sectors of the FLN with the guerrillas and the Algerians by agreeing to consider the loan of two "Transalls" as a mere episode without consequence. The importance of the Algerian concession can be gauged when one considers the fact that the mere overflight of the Western Sahara by French "Jaguars" based in Mauritania was at the time looked upon as an intervention in the pure colonial tradition.

The dispute between Tunis and Tripoli remains intact; and no matter what image is conferred by the interventionist policy of its chief upon the Libyan Jamahiriyyah, the Tunisian Government deprived of Mr Nouira and carried at arms length by a man exhausted by ordeals, hardly has the resources to match the Libyan battering. The decision to strengthen the Tunisian army seems above all to be a situational measure, if we take a look at the formidable Libyan arsenal and the enormous financial resources of Libya. Neither the OAU in which Qadhdhafi has sure supporters and allies, nor the Arab League have intervened in a significant way. The Pan-African organization has just reaffirmed the principle of nonintervention in the internal affairs of member states. Libya which is occupying part of Chad and is arming the POLISARIO could not, therefore, utter the slightest condemnation in that forum. The lodging of the Libyan complaint against Tunisia with the Arab League did, however, have a startling effect, since it amounted to nothing less than condemnation of "the military occupation of Tunisia by France."

The Tunisian response to repeated Libyan interventions in Tunisia was not appropriate. It is useless to cite its past history in Chad or even in Uganda. For Qadhdhafi, it was only a question of asserting Libyan power under the flag of Islam. Close analysis produces the following comments:

--in the above-mentioned countries, the Jamahiriyyah supported one faction against others. What is more the headlong flight of its famous "Arab legion" in Uganda before Tanzanian soldiers proved the inanity of that kind of action;

--in Tunisia the emotional and psychological implications of its action are at the root of the conflict. Colonel Qadhdhafi demands respect for a merger agreement which was duly initialed by the "Supreme Combatant." Like all Arab peoples, the Tunisian people are sensitive to Arab unity watchwords. That is an indubitable reality.

It is common knowledge that Qadhdhafi's seduction was used against some Tunisian leaders; e.g., the former Tunisian minister of foreign affairs, Mr Masmoudi. Other high officials are in favor in Tripoli without having brought disgrace upon themselves. Mrs Wassila Bourguiba, the wife of the president and an influential personality in Tunisian political life, regularly makes the trip to Tripoli. This contributed considerably to Colonel Qadhdhafi's belief that Tunisia was 'ripe for picking.' One would display his naivete if he were to believe that Qadhdhafi has not been encouraged to repeatedly revive the idea of a merger between the two countries. Oil is the basis for many mirages...

The Fight of the Clans

With Gafsa (even if the attack on the city resulted largely from a blocked social situation) Qadhdhafi advanced a pawn on the chessboard knowing full well that in the present state of affairs the Tunisian Government was not in

a position to offer him firm resistance and to match his maneuvers except to appeal to a foreign power, which evidently would fulfill its commitments. Mr Nour's cerebrovascular illness will confirm his conviction that Mr Bourguiba is in a state of political weakness. Without overly masking his thoughts, he did not hesitate to make known that "the elimination" [sic] of the Tunisian prime minister overjoyed him and that he was ready to "pardon" Tunisia if the chief of the Tunisian state surrounded himself with "true nationalists." That is the language of a man who believes himself to be strong. It is also the language of someone who is very well informed about the fight of the clans which is poisoning the Tunisian political climate. The enmity between Mr Nour and Mr Bourguiba's wife is in fact obvious. Mohamed Sayah, director of the single party and a supporter of unnuanced authoritarianism who is generally credited with an unconditional attachment to the person of the "Supreme Combatant," is the chief of the clan of Sahelians, a region of which the chief of state is a native. The bloody events of 18 February 1978 are said to have been attributable, according to his detractors, to his desire to break up the trade union organization whose secretary general, Habib Achour, had gone to Tripoli to meet with Colonel Qadhafi in the presence of Mohamed Masmoudi, who was ejected from the government in 1974 because of his role in the aborted merger attempt. This fight of the clans is matched by a regional clanism to the point of tribalism which President Bourguiba has combatted all his life as the worst of cankers.

The clan of the "Sahelians" as a whole constitutes the hard core of the Destourian apparatus. The clan of the "moderates" is that of politicians from Tunis which is now working on its union with the "dissidents" of Mr Mestiri, former minister, who is to be found in the "Social Democratic" movement, an opposition party not officially recognized but tolerated by the government. With slight differences, these clans openly proclaim their defiance of Colonel Qadhafi and miss no opportunity to reiterate their attachment to President Bourguiba. Whether a political ploy or sincerity on their part, the fact is that the government knows how to play upon the theme of the necessary national union in the face of the maneuvers of a foreign government.

To the extent that Gafsa derived from the bloody confrontations of the winter of 1978 which plunged Tunisia into mourning, it is a strictly Tunisian affair. The position taking by the above-mentioned politicians have all run in the direction of "forgetting the past" without a single voice being raised in support of liberalization of the government and demanding general amnesty, the wish of the great majority of Tunisians. What is more that is typical of Tunisian political customs: one forgets and one goes on. If Tunisians were induced to take up arms against their country, it was essentially because of this absence of recourse. Seen in this way, the Gafsa attack falls within a perfectly logical sequence: Colonel Qadhafi's activism found the climate ideal for it to prosper in the Tunisian political vacuum.

The Modus Vivendi?

Libya is not the innocent scapegoat of an orchestrated campaign by "the ogre" who is making ready to devour tiny Tunisia. Young unemployed Tunisians are obviously being solicited by the Libyan special services; however, it would be incorrect to believe that 100 young people had agreed to be armed against their fellow countrymen out of venality, as was stated by the Tunisian press, or because they were fascinated by the truisms contained in the notorious green book.⁶ On television, Ahmed Merghenni, leader of the guerrillas, said straight out that Qadhdhafi's "agenda" did not interest him: "I used Qadhdhafi to overthrow the Tunisian regime." For a man who had only a few days left to live, dissimulation was no longer appropriate. The "hue and cry against Qadhdhafi" which has been making the rounds of Tunis lately should not hide this obvious truth: the Gafsa sources were Tunisian.

Getting back to the attack itself, one certainty emerges: Gafsa was not the popular uprising announced by the opposition nor a fortiori even an insurrection even though part of the population joined the attackers. At the outset, Libyan participation was so unobtrusive that the authorities at first named Algeria before realining their sights. We know very little about what really happened even if it is formally established that a powerfully armed group of Tunisians entered the city on the night of 26-27 January to join with another group already in place. The crossing of the Algerian-Tunisian border in a single night is ruled out by President Bourguiba who was on vacation in Oases de Nefta, 60 km from there, since the army was on the alert. What is more, the numerous arms caches discovered and the number of city inhabitants implicated in the affair attest to the fact that the official position that only armed mercenaries from abroad were involved does not stand up to an examination of the facts.

Nevertheless, at the beginning of April, we had reason to believe that the two countries were going to find a modus vivendi in the absence of a durable reconciliation, although the execution of the 13 defendants who were sentenced to death further blunts the hypothesis and complicates the situation. Armed conflict as recently as a few weeks ago, in spite of everything, was threatening to be the only practicable outcome. In fact, it was difficult to conceive of Colonel Qadhdhafi's renouncing his deadly methods particularly after the incapacitating illness of Mr Nouira which accentuated the political vacuum around the chief of state.

FOOTNOTES

1. p 97: As the result of a general strike called by the Tunisian General Confederation of Labor which the government decided to ban, a severe repression claimed numerous civilian victims. Members of the trade union's leadership were arrested.

2. p 98: Mrs Wassila Bourguiba, wife of the president, has often traveled to Tripoli, as have many Tunisian ministers.
3. Libya imports olive oil, fruits and vegetables and large amounts of building materials.
4. In fact, a merger agreement was really initialed which went so far as to designate the heads of ministerial posts. Mr Nouira and Colonel Qadhdhafi were to have been vice presidents of the "Islamic Arab Republic," of which the "Supreme Combatant" was to have been the president.
5. p 99: Qadhdhafi has always said that he has filial feelings for President Bourguiba.
6. p 103: A pamphlet containing allegedly innovative ideas on the concept of democracy! Qadhdhafi feels that in the future it will change the world...

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INTER-ARAB AFFAIRS

'JEUNE AFRIQUE' REPORTS ALGERIAN-MOROCCAN TALKS HELD

Rabat L'OPINION in French 3 Aug 80 p 1

[Text] The weekly "JEUNE AFRIQUE" reports this week in its "Confidential" section that Algerians and Moroccans "opened negotiations during a secret meeting in Geneva between 10 and 19 July sponsored by Saudi Arabia.

"Attending for Algeria were important persons close to President Chadli such as Col Kandi Merbah and Maj Slimane Hoffman. The Moroccan delegation was headed by Gen Ahmed Dlimi assisted by Reda Guodira, special adviser to King Hassan II," JEUNE AFRIQUE concludes.

CSO: 4400

AFGHANISTAN

AFGHAN LEADER EMPHASIZES POWER OF ISLAMIC UNITY

Quetta JANG in Urdu 20 Jun 80 p 8

[Article: "Afghan Liberation Movement Threatens to Spread to Muslim Areas in Russia; Islamic Alliance Forces Change in U.S., Western Countries' Attitude"]

[Text] Abdul Halim Raqam, a prominent spiritual leader of Afghanistan, said in Islamabad that the establishment of the three-member committee at the meeting of the foreign ministers of the Islamic alliance offers two options to Russia. These are either to withdraw its army from Afghanistan and establish contact with this committee, or face an embarrassing defeat and the spread of the liberation movement into Uzbek, Tajik, and Khazak provinces. Raqam appealed to the Muslims of the world in general and Afghan Muslims in particular to stay united at this crucial moment, as this unity will pave the way for an Afghan victory and make the Muslim religion a world power. He said that the role of Pakistan in the Muslim alliance is very important, as every Pakistani is ready to sacrifice his life for the cause. He further said the U.S. cannot take any more military actions in Iran, because of the Islamic alliance. Raqam added that the Islamic alliance has forced all big powers to review their policies. He called the recent conference of Islamic foreign ministers as the most important event in world politics. According to him, the establishment of the three-member committee, which refused to recognize the present Afghan government, was a show of power. Babrak Karmal is aware that he is alone, and he will face the same fate as Taraki and Hafizullah Amin. He said that the sacrifice of life never goes to waste. We must show an example of unprecedented alliance, he said. Islam's only asset is the power of unity, he concluded.

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AFGHANISTAN

EAST EUROPEAN, SOUTH YEMEN TROOPS BELIEVED TO BE IN AFGHANISTAN

Karachi JASARAT in Urdu 1 Jul 80 pp 3,6

[Article: "Heavy Fighting in Piktia; 430 Russian, Afghan Soldiers Killed; South Yemen Troops join Russian, Czech, Cuban and Bulgarian Troops; Mujahidin destroy Sarobi Power Station, Military Bus in Kanter; Three Russian Tanks and 18 Soldiers killed in Ch ga Sarai; Afghan Army Threatens to Mutiny in Ghazni"]

[Text] Kabul, 30 June--Nine Russian soldiers were killed and the Sarobi power station was destroyed in a fierce battle between the Mujahidin and Russian tanks. In addition, the Mujahidin have taken full control of the Arki Barak subdivision of Kabul province. This happened when the Government Army surrendered to the Mujahidin.

The Mujahidin destroyed a minibus in Kandahar. Six militiamen and seven Russian soldiers were killed in this incident in Marwar district. All the occupants of the bus were either killed or wounded. In another incident, three tanks going from Haifa Sarai to Jalalabad were put out of action by anti-tank mines. These mines were planted between Sarkafi bridge and Nausabad. Eight Russians were killed in this incident.

Meanwhile, the Russians have increased their activities in Badkhashin. The Mujahidin launched major attacks in Bafta and Ragh districts on 14 June. The battles raged for ten days. It is believed that Czech and Cuban soldiers were with the Russian army. They were assisted by 35 helicopters, 12 Migs, land-based surface-to-surface missiles, and heavy artillery. Most of the villages in this area were destroyed by heavy bombing. Sargal, Paishail Kol Darra, Shair Chang, Langar, Shah Amin, Toba Darra, Dev Mohammed Hussein, Sar Darra, Rabata, Chashma Daid, and Dev Darra are among the demolished villages. Men, women, and old people were killed during this bombing, and the survivors took to the mountains. Thousands of people were either killed or wounded in this act of the Afghan army. Fifteen Mujahidin were killed and seven are missing in action.

Afghan soldiers in Ghazni have demanded immediate stoppage of the bombing of areas outlying Ghazni. These soldiers have threatened to mutiny if the bombing is not stopped by the Russians. Thousands of innocent men, women and children have been killed in and around Ghazni in these bombing incidents.

According to a report from London, some Afghan soldiers were arrested and the remaining soldiers mutinied and attacked the Russians. Over 200 Afghan soldiers rebelled near Mazar Sharif (only 1000) in Balakh. They joined the Mujahidin. In order to control the remaining soldiers and prevent their fleeing, the government had to arrest one hundred soldiers and put other rebels under house arrest in their barracks. It was learned that the Afghan soldiers feel that they are used as a vanguard by the Russians. The Afghan soldiers suffer heavy casualties because of this practice. If the Afghan soldiers try to flee, or show lack of interest in fighting the Mujahidin, the Russians in the rearguard shoot at them.

According to reports reaching New Delhi, Afghan soldiers killed 50 Mujahidin in Sangar Mar province. According to these reports, another 30 were arrested for supposedly killing some members of the ruling Marxist party.

Meanwhile, according to the TELEGRAPH of London it is rumored that soldiers from South Yemen have arrived to help the Russians. This is confirmed by a diplomatic source who says that some soldiers who appear to be from Yemen were observed around Kabul. This diplomatic source also reports that Bulgarian military instructors are training Afghan drivers.

According to a report from Kabul, the Mujahidin dealt a crushing defeat to the Russian army sometime during the last two weeks. This report mentions an attack by the Russians with 1,000 tanks on the Mujahidin. This resulted in fierce battles in Argona, Aramat, Gaard and Khoust. The Mujahidin destroyed 74 Russian tanks and killed 300 Russian soldiers in Pikitia province. Meanwhile, nine members of Khalq party were killed by the Mujahidin in Aramat. One hundred Afghan soldiers were killed in the Arri police station area. Another 78 Afghan soldiers were killed by the Mujahidin in Argon and Khaushat.

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AFGHANISTAN

PRESENCE OF CZECH, CUBAN SOLDIERS REPORTED IN AFGHANISTAN

Lahore NAWA-I-WAQT in Urdu 1 Jul 80 pp 3, 10

[Article: "Mujahidin Attack Power Station in Sarobi, Kill Nine Russian Soldiers"]

[Text] Kabul, 30 June--According to news received here from Sarobi in Kabul province, Afghan Mujahidin attacked a power station here and killed nine Russian and Afghan soldiers. However, the Mujahidin were routed when the Russians used tanks. The Mujahidin claim that Barki Barak province is totally in their control, according to reports from Mogar province. Afghan soldiers had surrendered here to the Mujahidin on 24 June. This place is 30 kilometers from Kabul city. The Mujahidin from Koonter province blew up a minibus on 25 June on a road in Marwar district of Sarkafi province. Six militia men and some Russians riding the minibus were killed. Eight Russians were killed when three tanks were destroyed with anti-tank mines on a bridge between Chaga Sarai and Jalalabad. The Russians have increased their forces and attacks on the Mujahidin in Badkhsan. They attacked the districts of Yafra and Ragh on 14 June. This attack lasted ten days and nights. Apparently Czech and Cuban soldiers are also with the Russian soldiers. They were assisted by 35 helicopters, 12 Migs, land based surface-to-surface missiles, and heavy artillery. Most of the villages in this area were destroyed by the heavy bombing. Sargal, Paishail, Kol Darra, Shair Chang, Langar, Shah Amin, Toba Darra, Deh Mohammed Hussien, Sar Darra, Rabata, Chashma baid, and Dev Darra are among the demolished villages. Men, women, children and old people were killed during this bombing, and many fled to the mountains. The attacking Russian army also suffered heavy casualties. Several hundreds of their soldiers were killed. Among the Mujahidin, fifteen were killed, 26 wounded and seven are missing.

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MUJAHID LEADER CLAIMS HALF MILLION AFGHANS KILLED

Karachi JASARAT in Urdu 3 Jul 1980 pp 1,6

[Article: "Mujahidin Break the Superpower Image of Russia, says Gulbuddin; Afghanistan Crisis to be Solved by Force, not Negotiation; 500,000 Afghans Killed, Two Million Taken Refuge; Jihad is Every Muslim's Duty (Mohammed Yasser), This Struggle is Unprecedented (Farouti)"]

[Text] Karachi 2 July--Engineer Hikmat Yar Gulbuddin said that the problem of Afghanistan cannot be solved by political negotiations, and requires a continuous struggle. If we succeed in our efforts, he said, this will be a milestone in the history of Islam and of mankind. He was addressing a reception given by the Chief Executive of JASARAT, Mr Mahmood Azam Farauti, at a local hotel. The reception was attended by important people of the city, in addition to journalists and newspaper editors. Mr Mohammed Yasser, President of Jamiat Islami (Organization of Muslims) also addressed the meeting.

Mr Gulbuddin said that the problem of Afghanistan was the problem of the entire Muslim world, as the Afghan Muslims have been fighting for the honor of the Muslim religion itself for the last two years. There has been a full scale war for the last few months, he said. He added that 500 thousand Muslims have been killed to-date, while two million have taken refuge in Pakistan and Iran. He said that God has rewarded the Afghans for their efforts with control of 80 percent of Afghanistan. Not only this, he said but we have had the opportunity to use our enemy's modern weapons against them. He added that "our efforts have resulted in breaking the image of Russia as a superpower, and, by the Grace of God, we will bring about religious revolution even in Russia." Engineer Gulbuddin ended his speech with famous verses by the poet Iqbal. The verses refer to Afghanistan as the heart of Asia--if it stops beating, Asia will be immobilized, and if it is silenced, Asia will be dead.

Mr Mohammed Yasser, President of Jamiat Islami of Afghanistan, said that the present war in Afghanistan is against Kufur (godlessness), and

in Kuran's war. There is no political motives on the minds of Muslims, he said. He added that the trumpet calling everyone to join the Jihad has been sounded, and that the Muslim world has a big responsibility now. He appealed to the journalists and editors to present the facts to the world. He said that he was shown some newspaper clippings in Geneva labeling the Mujahidin as smugglers who have settled in Pakistan. He expressed concern over these newspapers' wrong attitude. We are fighting a different battle, he said, and that is why we are getting help. He said that Muslim journalists have the responsibility to tell the world what the Afghan Mujahidin are exactly facing and fighting for. He further said that this (Afghan) problem is very important to the Muslim world in general and to the Pakistanis in particular. If the aggressor succeeded in defeating the Afghans, Pakistan will be its next target, he said. Commenting on Islamic unity, Mohammed Yasser said that "we can succeed only if we are united and allied."

Earlier, Mr Faraati of JASARAT explained that the purpose of this luncheon was to get the Mujahidin leaders and journalists together. He said that "we should consider the Afghan problem as our own problem." He said that "the achievements of Afghan Muslims are first of their kind. The superpower was under the impression that it would take control of Afghanistan in a couple of days by means of its modern weapons. But the unarmed and those with old weapons have been giving it a good fight for the last six months. It is evident that the Afghan Mujahidin have vowed to sacrifice themselves for their religion and country."

7997

CSO: 4203

AFGHANISTAN

BRIEFS

PRO-RUSSIAN HERO SHOT--New Delhi, 18 June--Maj Gen Abdul Qadir, hero of the pro-Russian revolution in Afghanistan, was shot in Kabul on Monday. According to a tourist arriving here from Kabul, Maj Gen Abdul Qadir, formerly commander of the Air Force, who played a prominent role in April 1978 to bring down the Daud Government, was admitted to a military hospital. This information was given by a Japanese tourist, who said that Abdul Qadir was attacked in the courtyard of the building housing the ministry of foreign affairs. He is out of danger now. The Japanese tourist further said that it is commonly believed in Kabul that Abdul Qadir was shot by a member of Khalq. The Khalq faction of the ruling Marxist party is engaged in a fight against the Parcham party and its supporters, including Karmal. A number of Parcham and Khalq members have been killed in many skirmishes. [Text]
[Quetta JANG in Urdu 19 Jun pp 1, 4]

CSO: 4203

BRIEFS

PARTIAL BAPCO TAKEOVER--Bahrain Minister of Development and Industry Yusuf al-Shirawi has announced that the Bahrain government will assume control of 60 percent of the Bahrain Petroleum Company (BAPCO) refinery. In a press statement carried by the Gulf News Agency, al-Shirawi said that this participation in the refinery will be carried out in such a manner as to not affect the company's current operations. Speaking of the time period required to carry out the transfer of ownership, the Bahrain minister said that this would depend on the completion of financial and legal arrangements, and on the government's acceptance of negotiations going on in this respect, the first round of which began in London and the second round of which will continue in Bahrain. With reference to the status of the company's workers after the transfer of ownership, he said, "We will keep in mind the rights of the employees and workers who have served the company for a long time, but we will also strive to "Bahrainize" positions and place Bahrain employees in sensitive leadership positions in the new company." [Text] [Doha AL-'URUBAH in Arabic 22 May 80 p 9] 8559

NEW GENERATOR ACTIVATED--Bahrain Minister of Works, Electricity and Water Majid Jawad al-Jishi activated the fourth generator at the al-Rifa' power plant. The start-up was attended by Assistant Deputy Minister for Electricity and Water Affairs Jamil al-'Alawi, Director of the Electricity Department 'Abdallah Jum'ah, and plant officials. His Excellency toured the plant and inspected the progress of work there. He also delivered a statement in which he expressed his happiness at inaugurating this generator according to the time table, and said that in order to complete the plant there remains the inauguration of the fifth generator, which will hopefully be activated in July, at which time the final phase of the above-mentioned power plant will be completed. He spoke of Bahrain's electricity consumption, saying that it is continually increasing; in order to meet this growing consumption, it has been decided to build another power plant at the same location, with a capacity of 300 megawatts. He said that the new plant's first generator will be activated in 1983. [Text] [Doha AL-'URUBAH in Arabic 22 May 80 p 9]

LEADERS GIVE VIEWS ON PREVENTING COUPS D'ETAT

Dr Mostafa Chamran

Tehran KEYHAN in Persian 30 Jul 80 p 12

[Text] Dr Mostafa Chamran, Minister of National Defense and Tehran representative, said in answer to our question: Just as I said in the Majles, the recent coup d'etat plot was in reality no more than an adventure. Our Army is an army that stands by the nation and defends the Islamic revolution. If this army had not been standing by the people during the days before the revolution achieved results, there is no doubt that we would have had hundreds of thousands of martyrs, not 60,000. Furthermore, the biggest part, if not all of our army is on the side of the nation and on the side of protecting the Islamic revolution.

At the same time, however, there are a few people in this army who are likely to take part in adventures, just as it has occurred, but at the same time we also saw that the army itself, in cooperation with other armed revolutionary organizations, stopped it in its tracks. Such adventures take place everywhere in the world.

Thus there is no ground for a coup d'etat to start in the army or outside it. Unbelieving elements in the army were cast aside after the victory of the revolution. We must strive to maintain ties between the nation and the army. Unity and solidarity between the nation and the army constitute the greatest power against outsiders. The enemy tries to discredit the army in the eyes of the people, and we are duty-bound to thwart this plot.

Concerning the elimination of the basis for coups d'etat, Chamran added: National awareness, unity, and solidarity under the decisive leadership of the Imam will not permit any kind of basis for a coup d'etat to exist. Thus, to eliminate the basis for a coup d'etat among the people, we must promote that awareness and unity among them. By the same token, we must follow a decisive and firm line in our foreign policy so the world will accept the fact that there is a government with popular support in Iran, and this people's government is capable of smashing any kind of plot.

Majles Member Dastgheyb

Tehran KEYHAN in Persian 30 Jul 80 p 12

[Text] Gowharolshari'eh Dastgheyb, Tehran representative, referred initially to the factors that encourage plotters to stage coups, saying:

The coup d'etat plotters, relying on their mental schemes, wanted to destroy a regime that did not suit their taste, and in its place to establish a military government to their liking. Of course this was the product of several factors, among them:

1. People who are loyal to the former regime and servants of imperialism cannot sit idly by and see themselves exposed to danger or left outside of the political arena.
2. Those who have been hurt by the present regime and those who see their numerous interests on the verge of disappearing.
3. Unawareness and alienation of the coup d'etat plotter from the revolution, the contents of the revolution and the revolutionaries, which could itself be a favorable basis for a coup d'etat.
4. The coup d'etat plotter affixes false hopes to a future that will bring him money and position. This fills his eyes and ears and occupies his mind.
5. Discord and difference of opinion among the people and also lack of confidence in those running the current regime, and again those loyal to the former regime create the background for this kind of thinking, and in this case it can be an effective factor for putting coup d'etat plotters in the right frame of mind to exploit this unfavorable situation to the advantage of their bosses. Everywhere in the world such circumstances have imposed evil exploiters and many coups d'etat have taken place.

On the subject of eliminating the basis for a coup d'etat, Ms Dastgheyb said: First we must destroy and eliminate from society the supporters and followers of foreign powers and the former regime. The rest of the people, including the ones who have been hurt, those who are unaware, and those who hope for power and autonomy must be sufficiently warned that they are dealing with a determined nation and not to forget its decisive leadership. The people must also be warned not to relax their vigilance for an instant, and to become more alert and determined.

Seyyed Nurollah Tabataba'i, representative of Ardestan, considered a rapid purge of the army necessary in order to eliminate the basis for a coup d'etat and he believed that in order to eliminate the basis for a coup d'etat and a plot we must rapidly and decisively purge the army before we do anything else. The only people who should remain in the army are those who believe in the Islamic revolution.

Accordingly, we must employ those who have faith in the Islamic revolution in all the country's defense organizations, irrespective of the special skills they require.

Here I must stress that at the present time there is no basis for a coup d'etat in Iran, for any coup that hopes to succeed must prepare the people psychologically and create various other conditions. Fortunately, at the present time such conditions do not exist among our people. For the future, however, we must be careful that the enemies of Islam do not develop such conditions by stirring up dissatisfaction among the people and stationing their pawns within the country's executive organizations.

Dr Jamshid Haqgu

Tehran KEYHAN in Persian 30 Jul 80 p 12

[Text] Dr Jamshid Haqgu, former governor of Western Azarbaijan, answered:

Like all other problems and issues, this issue you have identified has great and special importance. Concerning the removal of problems and obstacles, which includes eliminating the basis for a coup d'etat, in my view the government must be truly strengthened and the multiplicity of decision-making centers be entirely eliminated and the situation changed so that there is effectively one center of power and a unity of command in domestic and military matters.

Haqgu added: Another issue that must be stressed is the matter of removing dissatisfaction among the people. Unfortunately, ever since the end of the revolution, dissatisfaction has been created for the people by some organizations. It is necessary to seek out the origins of the causes and instigators of these dissatisfactions immediately and to investigate them. Only after having done this will it be possible to hope to destroy any kind of coup d'etat plan in its beginnings through protection of the people and the country in general by the revolution.

Continuing his talk, he again referred to the government's plan for relieving the problems of the people:

When the government was weak there were various centers of power making decisions for the people, and since decisions by this kind of center have no official or legal quality, they brought about the greatest discomfort, dissatisfaction, and probably incitement and an environment receptive to counterrevolutionary ideas. On account of its weakening of the central government this inevitably delayed the implementation of public works and reform programs. This issue has a close relationship to matters I have raised earlier.

He then referred to the issue of leadership in the army and the military forces, and added: This subject, what should we do to eliminate the basis

for a coup d'etat, I think, in the case of the armed forces, should be pursued by establishing a single command over the army, the gendarmerie, and the rest of the armed forces. Among Haqqi's other revolutionary steps, finally, he mentioned administrative reform as another of the ways to remove the basis for a coup d'etat, and he said: We should truly reform the administrative system so they can deal with the people's problems. The administrative offices should be so constituted that they encourage the people to work and to be active. In short, it is my belief that what should be done in order to thwart or eliminate the basis for coups d'etat is merely to strengthen the central government and eliminate multiple decision making centers.

Dr Ebrahim Yazdi

Tehran KEYHAN in Persian 30 Jul 80 p 12

[Text] Dr Ebrahim Yazdi, representative of the people of Tehran in the Islamic Consultative Assembly, said after hearing the question: The breeding grounds for a coup d'etat are of two types, foreign and domestic. The foreign ones will never disappear. As long as the identity of our revolution and its essence remains Islamic, as long as our nation continues to make constant revolution and to stand up against the superpowers and resist, foreign staging areas for coups d'etat will never disappear.

We must realize that our enemies will do anything to destroy this revolution and the Islamic Republic. What we can do is to remain ever-vigilant and to study the enemy's line and his strategy pertaining to us, to identify the enemy's probable strategy take the necessary steps based upon that to eliminate its domestic staging areas.

The greatest dangers confronting us are the domestic coup d'etat breeding grounds. I mean all domestic political, economic, and social situations and states that set up favorable circumstances for the enemy's activities, such as intensification of domestic discord, involvement of domestic forces of the revolution in internal disputes, administrative and economic chaos and heedlessness of the dangers of the enemy. These are the domestic breeding grounds. As long as domestic circumstances are not suitable for the activities of the enemies of the revolution, our enemies will never be able to pull off a coup d'etat or to do anything else.

In my view, it is more important that we teach the people what to do in the event of a probable enemy coup d'etat's success and what their duties would be than it is to uncover and thwart plots. In other words, supposing our enemies had brought off their coup d'etat on the day they had designated. In that case, what would have been the people's responsibility for the various tasks related to military mobilization and resisting the agents of the coup d'etat? Anticipation of these matters and systematic training of the people are more important than discovering and thwarting plots.

Dr Golzadeh Ghafuri

Tehran KEYHAN in Persian 30 Jul 80 p 12

[Text] Ayatollah 'Ali Golzadeh Ghafuri said: In general, we must first know from which groups these plotters originate and how their thinking works as they formulate their plans, and second how, in their view, the circumstances of society were such that they thought they would be victorious, realizing that most of them were military people who thought a system existed in the army that had remained intact after the revolution, and that is that in the army there is the principle of command and obedience, and that they could therefore have used this principle to govern.

As long as the army has not become a people's army (I have also said in the assembly that our little children must be militarily equipped. Out of 35 million people, 30 million should be armed.) there will always be plots and plotters.

As for how these people thought they could be victorious:

This group considers itself despised. It wants to return the situation to a previous time and to vindicate itself. Foreign political strengths are based on the following principles: Exertion of pressure, force, and killing to create discontent among the strata of society in order to extend their range and by doing this to tire the people of dissatisfaction in the areas of white collar work, unemployment, the cost of living and the courts.

On the whole the people are not ready to submit to a dictatorship.

In sum therefore, they saw the possibility of success because of:

- the nature of the army;
- the people not being equipped; and
- popular dissatisfaction.

Another point from the point of view of the plotters is that the ones acting on matters now do not have a firm foothold. Furthermore, the people's thinking will change quickly. Of course, they have judged mistakenly. They did not think the people were of a revolutionary mind.

Then Ayatollah Golzadeh Ghafuri said concerning what should be done to prevent a repetition of the coup d'etat: We must remember the need for improvements in four areas:

1. We must change the present organization of the military. The people must be armed and there should be ten to fifteen thousand specialists. In this way conspiracies will not be effective.

2. Preparedness of the people. Since the people will be situated throughout the strata of society, by preparing the people a way will be found that they cannot inflict damage by changing the government.

3. Arresting public dissatisfaction: We must give the people a share in life so that the people will know that society belongs to them and there will be no basis for a coup d'etat to enable a minority to do something using the army and foreign powers.

4. People's participation in decision making.

An important matter that deserves attention is piety. Piety should exist and be demonstrated in the upper levels. The Tabas incident and the SAVAK files must be brought out, and the nature of people who are going to hurt the people in any way should be recognized and clarified.

Pockets of complacency must be removed and superficial activities stopped, which cause abuses and dissatisfaction. Ayatollah Ghafari, concerning what persons, groups or individuals supported the coup d'etat or would support one in the event of its success, said: Those who benefitted from the previous military, or who unjustly exploit the Islamic military and who want society to reach a state of agitation in order to increase their own welfare and income, and those who want to restore the system of influence and favoritism and those who are indifferent. People must be roused out of their indifference and a strong faith instilled in them, and efforts must be made to relieve privation (the biggest weapon in the hands of the enemy) in politics, economics, and the military.

Again I repeat and stress that piety must be demonstrated and we must not disturb the people or reject them unnecessarily. The army must be reformed. All these things take a toll every time. America knows our army inside out. It knows all our defense systems. Higher level military training must quickly be made available to the people and the Revolutionary Guards who can use them, and we must strive to secure our defense so it will not come under outside domination. We must train the people in politics and economics, and by establishing justice and freedom we can eliminate plots. Justice and freedom must be on the increase every day. Justice must be a prominent feature in the courts, the administrations, and the media, so that people will not lapse into indifference.

9310

CSO: 4906

MEMBERS OF SUPREME JUDICIAL COUNCIL TO BE ANNOUNCED

Tehran **BANDAD** in **Peretan** 10 Jul 80 pp 1, 12

/Article: "Dr Beheshti, President of the National Supreme Court, Declared at a Press Conference that Names of Members of the Supreme Judiciary Council Will Be Announced Today"/

/Text/ Ayatollah Dr Beheshti, member of the Revolutionary Council and president of the National Supreme Court, took part in a press conference yesterday morning and replied to questions from domestic and foreign reporters.

In this conference, in response to a question regarding the Ministry of Foreign Affairs purge, Dr Beheshti said, "The minister of foreign affairs gave the council a report yesterday evening to the effect that about 600 out of a total of approximately 2,100 employees in this ministry have been purged; this activity will continue in this manner until the complete purification of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs." Dr Beheshti was asked, "The volume of currency in the time of Bazargan's government was 913 billion rials and at present it has reached 973 billion rials; how can this inflation be explained and what must be done to bring more of the people's money into circulation?" He answered, "The issue of inflation at the present time is automatically in contradiction with that of trying to provide the means for welfare, and is bringing such fluctuations about. For example, when loans are given to provide housing, the housing loans are a very large figure and housing loans of 300,000 to 400,000 are given to each person; certainly these people have also saved a certain amount of money and put both sums into circulation. Loans of this type automatically raise the volume of the money in the first months and cause a sort of inflation. The remedy for that is always to coordinate these measures on the basis of a program to increase domestic production and at the necessary times acquire the primary materials the people require from countries with which we can have economic relations, so that inflation may be avoided. However, such inflationary fluctuations are necessary at this stage in the economy."

Regarding the Ministry of Interior's declaration on the source of the meetings and demonstrations by groups and parties and the question as to

whether the Revolutionary Council had an overall plan for parties and groups, Dr Beheshti said, "The Ministry of the Interior has drawn up a law on parties and brought it to the Revolutionary Council. Some work has also been done on that, but I do not think that the final ratification of this law will actually be feasible. It is very likely that that will be in parliament's agenda."

In response to the question "What basically is your opinion on the appointment of the cabinet; when will the cabinet be presented, since there is much talk about the cabinet these days and there has been talk about reaching agreement or choosing a government and about various people as candidates for prime minister; and will the Islamic Republican Party present a special candidate?" Dr Beheshti said "The business of forming the Supreme Judiciary Council will be completed tomorrow (today). Since this is the final day for taking votes, the votes will be counted tomorrow (today) and their results will most probably be announced by tomorrow evening (this evening), and we will thus present the Supreme Judiciary Council of the guardian jurists at the convening of the first session of the Supreme Judiciary Council. Thus, at the beginning of the coming week, that is, in 2 or 3 days, the council will have no /remaining/problems as regards completing the membership of the Guardian Council; of course the parliament has also completed its work in this period and bylaws have been drawn up during this period. Yesterday evening when I asked my friends, they said that this activity would also be completed in another day or two. It is a source of satisfaction that in spite of the compulsory, unwanted delay which arose in the selection of the three other members of the Supreme Judiciary Council there has not even been 1 day's delay in the parliament's activity. During this period they had to get to the credentials, which they did, and certainly arrange the bylaws, which was also quickly carried out, and they have to make arrangements whereby they will rapidly ratify temporary bylaws. Later the election of the council of the permanent president and then the appointment of the cabinet will take place. If no complications in the activity arise, we must witness special urgency in the coming week in preparing the preliminaries for various activities, and it is very likely that it will be practical toward the end of next week or the early part of the following week to address the subject of appointing the prime minister. The representatives have exchanged views with one another in this regard and from the standpoint of the party and from the standpoint of political duty the Islamic Republican Party has, naturally, views in this field, which the representatives know. However, what is important is that we have always agreed on the fact that the basic matter is one of criteria, not persons, and, after the criteria have been determined, making decisions with regard to people is not a very complex matter. God willing, in this regard the nation and society will feel that the job of appointing the prime minister will be carried out in a good manner which is compatible with the pace of the revolution." Dr Beheshti added, "The party has stated its views before and will state them again at the right time. Once or twice in this period, exchanges of views occurred in

the central committee of the party and previous views were presented along with new ones. This exchange of views will still continue and at the last opportunity will be conveyed to our friends."

Responding to a question from a reporter who was asking about the execution of women, Dr Beheshti said "Of course a confession and witnesses are not both necessary--that is, either there are witnesses, or there is a confession, with all its particular aspects--however, as to whether what has happened conforms to those criteria or not, the responsibility for that is the task of the judge and you must not ask me; if anyone knows about a violation or laxity on the part of a judge, he must give notification, and the meaning of appointing a judge is that people have taken his fitness into consideration. I cannot precisely state that that was in accordance with the criteria and I cannot state that it was not, because one cannot rule on his work here."

Answering the question "The people of Iran are less informed about the judiciary laws of Islam and the Koran; do you not consider it necessary to propagate the laws of Islam so that the people may be informed?" Dr Beheshti said, "Certainly, but these laws must be arranged in the form of articles of law, and people are now engaged in arranging them; as far as parliament goes the framing of the law will also be ratified and after that it will be conveyed to the people. Some of the laws which are now being implemented are laws which the people know--for example, if someone who has a wife commits adultery and a woman who has a husband commits adultery, their punishment will be grave; I think people in general know that."

Dr Beheshti was asked "The message of the emam involved various aspects; it did not just involve purges in the departments and the veil; it also entailed changes in the system of administration; what steps have been taken in this regard?" He said, "Work has taken place in the Revolutionary Council and also we had a long session yesterday evening during which period we held a discussion of perhaps 4 hours on these subjects. There is no doubt that they have different aspects and this matter must not be summarized within the confines of formal changes, because changes are both formal and radical, since their form, identity and nature must be homogeneous. The formal changes are just quicker and more apparent and the radical changes more difficult, slower and less well known. In regard to the radical changes, discussion was held repeatedly in the latest sessions of the Revolutionary Council and both the council, whose work will be completed in the next few days, and the parliament and cabinet have plans in this regard, but the issue which I must raise is that we should place emphasis on the fact that the determining role is the aware, comprehensive participation of the people is somewhat slight and cannot have confidence in that advantage to which you refer. We hope that this participation will continue."

11887

END 006

PARTY ORGAN CRITICIZES NATIONAL ADMINISTRATION

Tehran RAMDAD in Persian 3 Jul 80 p 9

/Article: "Iranian Nation Party Criticizes Irregularities in Iran's Administrative System"/

/Text/ ARMAN-E MELLAT, the organ of the Iranian Nation Party, under the title "The Powers of Administration and Work Procedures," stressing the point that white collar workers, like all social groups, are prepared for all kinds of self-sacrifice, has criticized the irregularities in Iran's current administrative system and the fact that the ugly standards and areas of the past which arose from the administrative procedures of organizations have remained. In one part of this article, it was stated,

"The reconstruction of human conduct is one of the most basic duties of the government. No government can expect the people appropriate for its work procedures to appear automatically.

"All governments, in order to carry out their objectives, are compelled to proceed to bring about a change in the evaluation and conduct of people.

"Military regimes have the power to create and produce their powerful combat troops and officers from among scattered human beings.

"As long as these capitalistic governments sow the spirit of the acquisition of wealth and efforts to gain money in people's spirits by their own particular methods, moral governments have no choice either but to bring people into being themselves who are suitable for the schedule of values of their social system.

"As of the day after the revolution, the government of the Islamic Republic of Iran should also have faced this grave responsibility in an aware fashion. The government of the Islamic Republic of Iran should have taken note of the point that over generations the distressed group of our nation has been under the blows of a vile disturbed cultural system and that this vile disturbed system, whether one likes it or not, left an effect on the style,

values and conduct of people and created an in appropriate and even sick morality in many of them.

"Among the people who were under the blows of the vile cultural system of the past, government employees were afflicted more than other groups.

"Government employees, because of the firm, extensive relationship they had with the ruling regime, in terms of earning their living, had no choice but to accommodate many of this regime's approaches in their style, values and conduct. This group was also vexed and uneasy over the styles of behavior which had been imposed upon it. This group more or less clearly realized that what was requested of it in the name of the working procedure of the royal madhouse-court was contradictory to the lofty humane and Islamic system of morality. This group, any time it gained the opportunity, condemned the working procedure of the vile court by all the means at its disposal.

"The extensive strikes of government employees during the period of the Islamic revolution of the people of Iran and their brilliant stand in the face of the selfish system of government are one of the shining pages of the life of this social group and very firm proof of its innate moral values. People who in the confrontation with the past regime of the court showed such power on their own parts can absolutely and unequivocally play a fruitful, effective role in rebuilding our nation."

In conclusion, the article stated:

"The masses of the white collar workers, like all social groups are still prepared for every kind of sacrifice and effort for the advancement of the country. However, the management of the administrative system must acquaint this mass of employees with a new spirit and with new standards of work. Conflicting with the mass of employees and retaining the current administration will not increase the power of our administrative system, nor will it advance our revolutionary achievements.

"The administrative system of Iran lies in management itself. The current management is not aware or prepared for the job. A management must quickly be provided for the country which is aware and powerful and will acquaint the workers of the government with the schedule of values of the Islamic revolution of the Iranian nation and make use of their presence during the construction period."

11867

CSO: 4906

IRAN

STATUS OF DEALINGS WITH JAPAN UPDATED

Tehran BANDAD in Persian 28 Jun 80 p 8

/Article: "Tadeo Mitani, Resident Manager of the Japanese Construction Firm Kumagaigumi in Iran, Contractor for the Power Ministry Tehran-Esfahan-Kuhrang Water Transmission Plan: We Are Not Happy with the Japanese Government's Policy of Economic Boycott of Iran"/

/Text/ The Kumagaigumi Iran Company is a great Japanese construction firm: at the present time it is the Power Ministry's contractor and executor of the complicated Tehran-Esfahan-Kuhrang project to transmit water and has more than 1,000 Iranian workers.

This is one of the limited Japanese companies which have always tried to exert all its powers to advance the projects assigned to it, removed from political problems. Especially in the current sensitive conditions where the American economic boycott has been imposed and the government of Japan is confused over choosing between compulsory solidarity with American imperialism and national interests and the maintenance of good economic relations with Iran, it is trying as far as possible, in following the Japanese character, just to engage in completing its current projects and avoid the tempest of political struggles.

Before this, the Kumagaigumi Iran Company was also involved in the construction of housing units for the Soviet Embassy and the project for the second main Iranian gasoline. The former project has been completed and the second one is currently suspended and inactive.

To gain greater awareness of the method of this company's actual activities and the way in which current conditions in relations between Iran and Japan are affecting the trend of progress on the project, we had a conversation with Tadeo Mitani, the resident manager of the company.

Tadeo Mitani, the resident manager of the company, is 46; from the start of the meeting he showed that he is an intelligent, active person, patient and forbearing in the face of problems--that is, precisely the characteristics which are necessary for managing a foreign company in alien territory.

Tadeo Mitani, whose specialization is in the field of economics and construction, states "We are active in the international context. Before this I was the manager of big projects in five countries of the world. These consisted respectively of the metro project in Hong Kong, the railway tunnels in Taiwan, irrigation canals in the Philippines, tunnel construction in Malaysia and big main highways in Indonesia."

The resident manager of the company adds, "The Kumagaiumi Company of Japan, in addition to international activities in construction affairs, is also considered one of the biggest manufacturers of building machinery, and machinery used in this company's dam building, tunnel construction and other extensive projects in the international context are built by the Kumagaiumi Company of Japan itself."

As he himself states, Tadeo Mitani has 22 years' experience in construction activities, 5 years of which involve the activities of his most recent years in the Kumagaiumi Iran branch.

As to when the projects the company is implementing in Iran will be completed, he says, "The Kuhrang project will reach the operating stage in 2 and a half years, the Esfahan project in another 2 years. The first phase of the Esfahan project has now approximately been completed and the second phase, which is a 5-kilometer tunnel, will be completed in about 2 years. At the same time, it is predicted that the Lar Dam tunnel will also be completed in 2 and a half years."

Tadeo Mitani continues, "Under the prevailing conditions and current atmosphere in Iran, most foreigners prefer to leave Iran and many of them had previously sent their families abroad; we not only do not have the inclination to leave Iran we have also kept our families in Iran, since we have a special relationship with Iran and feel that deep roots of affection and sincere relations between the two countries have given us a bond with each other. One of the motive forces for this feeling sprang forth about 5 years ago in the course of which economic problems led to recession and increased unemployment in Japan, and it was difficult for us to obtain suitable work. At that time, however, Iran presented us with some interesting recommendations for the implementation of important construction projects. Since then, both before and after the revolution, the Iranians have never provided the Japanese residing in Iran cause for discomfort and have always placed all possible facilities at our disposal. At such a time, how can we leave a project incomplete for such people who have given us assistance?"

The company's resident manager, in another part of his statement, says, "Japan's pursuit of America's policy of boycotting Iran economically has had an undesirable effect on the construction projects this company is in the process of carrying out, and its negative consequences on the fruits of our labor are a source of despair, since we are not satisfied or happy with the type of decisionmaking in this field, especially in light of the

fact that the project we are carrying out, that is, the water transmission project, is a humanitarian one. I can state categorically that we will not suspend the work under any conditions, unless the Iranian government asks to leave Iran.

We asked Tadeo Mitani "Have you also been faced with problems or not in the course of the company's activities?"

Tadeo Mitani said, "Our company's activities have always just been connected with the projects assigned and we have always avoided interfering in political matters and issues, in confirmation of the well known Iranian proverb 'What does a person whose account is clean have to fear from accountability?' We have also just thought about advancing the duties assigned and for this reason our employer, that is, the Ministry of Power and the Tehran and Esfahan Regional Water Organization, have always given us full cooperation and have eliminated our problems. As a result of that, this sincere, increasing cooperation exists between our employer and us. Conversely, we have always considered ourselves indebted and bound to carrying out the terms of the contract, which arise from the overall conditions of Iran. For example, one of the problems with which we were faced after the revolution was the question with which we were faced after the revolution was the question of hard currency. The Central Bank of Iran does not proceed on time with the transfer of hard currency for the purchase and importation of the machinery we have for the projects in the course of implementation, for reasons which are not clear and specific to us, and also the issuance and extension of work permits for Japanese nationals in Iran has faced problems."

Work Conditions in Iran

In response to the question "Are you satisfied or not with your work conditions in Iran, and what is the style of management you observe as the company's resident manager", Tadeo Mitani says, "I and my colleagues are very happy and satisfied to be working in Iran, have always respected Iranian laws in connection with our duties and always observe them carefully in all the affairs of our lives, including the work environment. We use the most advanced education techniques in instructing Iranian workers at all levels. Of course, as was pointed out, more than 1,000 Iranian workers are involved in jobs at the worksites of the Kamagaigumi Iran Company and, contrary to some illogical beliefs in some countries, are not only not lazy and slipshod, indeed, in our opinion, Iranian workers are to be considered hard workers, and we are confident that if the employer's conduct with workers is logical and reasonable, no particular problem will arise, and companies which have reached contrary conclusions concerning Iranian workers certainly do not have enough information at their disposal on the circumstances of Iranian workers. However, along with the belief I possess concerning the efficiency and perceptivity of Iranian workers, we must also point to some negative elements.

"As you know, we are a construction company and in no way do we have any interest, either, in interfering in Iran's political affairs. Unfortunately, however, some times acts and reactions occur in the workplace environment among Iranian workers and laborers which arise from political conditions and whose solution is outside the scope of one's powers."

Tadeo Mitani adds, "Our Iranian workers have questions which can be resolved. About 2 months ago we presented the results of our experience at meetings with the Iranian minister of labor and social affairs. For example, regarding construction workers who are unemployed after completion of a project and are without work for a while, until they obtain new work, we recommended that a plan be put in operation so that the project workers would receive wages from the government for an unemployment period of at least 6 months, until they found new work; of course the Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs would have to determine the conditions for that in accordance with the regulations they have."

The project manager of the company also mentions that there is an interest in expanding activities within Iran in the Kumagaiumi Company; it would like to offer its services to Iran especially in the realm of dam construction, where it has international experience, and also to cooperate closely with the Iranians in the field of subway and tunnel construction.

At another point, Tadeo Mitani mentioned "We at the present time are incurring nothing but loss and damage from the projects under construction, but we really do not expect profits either--our entire effort is to avoid greater losses by participating in new projects."

Welfare Resources

The Kumagaiumi Iran Construction Company employees consist of 150 engineers and technicians from Japan and about 1,000 Iranian workers who benefit from good welfare facilities.

The most important of these facilities are as follows:

1. The workers just live and rest in special camps which the company has provided.
2. A company service regularly transports the workers to Tehran.
3. Through two existing ambulances, a fully equipped company clinic with a doctor, a doctor's assistant, and necessary persons constitute an appropriate health team and provide the workers with health services.
4. The company's recreational credits are spent by the workers themselves in order to provide the best recreational means and equipment.
5. The company canteen is open to personnel day and night.

6. All employees benefit from social insurance services.

7. The company's movie theater shows movies for workers on appropriate occasions.

Conclusion: "In the near future the Kumagaigumi Iran Company wants to send about ten of its workers to Japan in order to become acquainted with activities similar to those they are performing in Iran. Our work progress now is about 30 percent of what had been expected--that is, we must, with the help of the personnel, try to advance the speed of the work much farther than this. I must also stress that we are continuing our activities in the belief that a very bright future awaits Iran and we are ready, finally, to expand efforts in constructive, humanitarian activities."

11887

CSO: 4905

'SECRET' POLL PREDICTS LIKUD OPPOSITION ROLE IN NEXT KNESSET

TA141541 Tel Aviv DAVAR in Hebrew 14 Aug 80 p 7

[Commentary by Arye Kinarti: "Atmosphere of Return To the Opposition in the Likud"]

[Excerpts] When Likud leaders publicly refer to election polls they sneer at the prophecies of Dr Mina Tzemah and other pollsters and define them as "negligible," false and, as Minister Burg put it, "Thou shalt keep away from polls." However, the truth is that the Likud is concerned about the polls, mainly by the polls conducted recently that were not made public.

One such poll conducted for the Likud, classified as "Secret and for Internal Use Only"--only few Herut members were lucky enough to peruse it--predicts the results of the elections and the decline of the Likud. The poll foresees for the Likud--in a list headed by Menahem Begin--from 27 to 30 Knesset seats. "That means that we are returning to the opposition seats," a Likud activist told us after he was told about the conclusions of the poll by a certain minister.

The results of the poll were disclosed during the time Begin was sick. The contents were apparently not revealed to Begin so as not to distress him and add to his internal and external troubles and woes, at a time when Ari'el Sharon and other cabinet members were upsetting him.

The poll predicting 27 to 30 seats for the Likud has already caused nervousness and various predictions among several Likud, Herut and Liberal Party leaders as well as speculation about the internal division of the "real and assured" seats in the Likud list.

Several Liberal Party leaders have recently voiced their ideas about what lies in store: "If the Likud indeed gets 30 or less seats, we, the Liberals, should reserve at least 10 seats for ourselves." These statements were made out of concern and on the assumption that in the next election the Likud will run in its current constellation--Herut, Liberals, La'am and Rafi.

The Liberal Party personality added: "Provided the Likud gets the predicted number of seats, we should not worry about [the independent factions of] Hillel Seidel and Asaf Yaguri and the "Fraternity" [Ahva] faction formed by Me's Shlomo Eliyahu, Shafiq Al'ad and 'Aqiva Nof wanting to join the Likud."

The Liberal Party heads were not ready to guarantee that Menahem Begin would constitute an electoral power in the next elections that would again sweep a large number of seats. "However, we do not have any other choice," they stated. The Liberals added: "Will an independent list headed by Mezer Weizman gain us more than what we will get from Begin--in the framework of the Likud--where our share is assured based on the present balance of power and according to the 'existent and static' situation?"

If the internal and public polls are correct, then there is no doubt that the Likud will suffer a sharp decline and even a collapse. The feeling is already prevalent in the Likud that their list in the 10th Knesset will be "crowded" both at the top--in the "assured" first dozens--and further down the line with plain candidates. "It will be very crowded in the opposition seats we will occupy in the 10th Knesset, particularly in the 'back seats'," a Likud activist told us. The same person also asked: "Will it be worth it to fight for the 30th seat and below it in the Likud list?"

The Liberals are concerned about the outcome of the ballot "for a good seat in the middle" of the Likud list. However, activists and elite members of Herut are even more concerned about it. A key Herut activist told us: "The Liberals have various options if the alignment wins--they could either join it or Weizman. We have no choice, we have nobody to join and trade horses with. We cannot be potential partners, either of the alignment or of any central list to be established in the future."

PSO: 4805

ISRAEL

POSSIBLE NEW EUROPEAN MIDEAST INITIATIVE

TA131127 Tel Aviv MA'ARIV in Hebrew 13 Aug 80 p 5

[Commentary by Shmu'el Segev: "A European Offensive In the Middle East"]

[Excerpts] The renewed freeze in the autonomy talks as shown up in the letters exchanged between Al-Sadat and Begin; the completion of the first round of talks by Gaston Thorne, the chairman of the EEC Council of Foreign Ministers, and his preparations for his upcoming visit to Cairo; and the campaign Egypt is about to launch in order to explain its positions on the autonomy issue--all these require Israel to deploy itself, as of now, for the possibility of a new European initiative at the next session of the UN General Assembly.

Some people see a link between the current European hyperactivity and the pan-Arab willingness to incorporate Europe into the peace process, and the statement Joseph Sisco made in Jerusalem that the Camp David agreements were not the "tablets of the law" and could be altered on the basis of mutual agreement, with the aim of incorporating Jordan into the peace process. The minor change that has occurred in the U.S. and Egyptian positions on a possible European initiative is thus explained as an understanding that an initiative of this sort will no longer contradict the Camp David agreements, but will perfect them.

This development must arouse the question in Jerusalem of whether Israel should not initiate a European initiative of its own, modelled on those of Jordan and Egypt. It is no secret that over the past year there has been a worrying erosion in the positions of Britain and West Germany and their Middle East policies are no different today from that of France. Even if, for various reasons, Jerusalem decides not to give too much weight to the European initiative by sending Foreign Minister Yitzhaq Shamir on another tour of Western Europe, the possibility of sending one of his aides on such a campaign should be seriously considered. Europe's exposure to Arab diplomatic activity alone could weaken Israel's position in the continent even further and make its future political moves even more difficult. However, a mission of this sort, if it is carried out, must be accompanied by a series of concrete decisions regarding the future of the autonomy talks.

The Jerusalem bill, however, justified and with all the national agreement it gained, has appreciably weakened Israel's position in the international arena and pushed it into a corner on the question of Jerusalem. Without denigrating the value of the Jerusalem bill and without changing the national agreement on the matter of the status of the unified city as the capital of Israel, Israel could come up with several ideas which would prove the degree of consideration afforded to the religious sensibilities of the members of the world's different faiths. A declaration about the granting of religious-administrative autonomy for the sacred places, or taking steps with a form of symbolic expression of consideration for the rights of Jerusalem's Arab inhabitants, such as the appointment of an Arab deputy mayor for Teddy Kollek, could prevent new UN resolutions that could be very hard to change in the future.

CSO: 4805

PERMANENT CONSTRUCTION UNDERWAY IN WEST BANK SETTLEMENTS

TA141954 Jerusalem Domestic Television Service in Hebrew 1800 GMT 14 Aug 80

[Excerpts] In recent months throughout Judaea and Samaria, among the hilly landscapes and between ancient villages, many settlements [hitnahaluyot] are in the process of being transformed into permanent settlements [yishuvim]. In the current fiscal year extensive construction momentum is underway in most of the settlements, with major construction work now being carried out at 15 sites.

In Shilo, for example, a settlement which began as a small [archaeological] excavation site with old trailers, 30 new prefabs have already gone up, and their number will soon reach the planned 40. As at Shilo, phase 3 is now being completed in most of the settlements; this is the stage of prefabricated structures. The past 2 years have seen over 500 such structures go up in the Judaea and Samaria settlements, at an investment of over 1 billion Israeli pounds.

The settlements are now at the start of the third and final phase: that of permanent construction. In several settlements, such as at Ari'el, the permanent construction is at an advanced stage. Most of the other settlements are envious of the Ari'el settlers, who will move into the first 65 cottages built by the Housing Ministry in about 3 months. These cottages--another 100 are slated for construction--are 115 square meters in area, with four rooms. The price of each cottage is 1.7 million Israeli pounds. According to the plan, this kind of permanent construction will soon get underway in other settlements, and these structures will replace the temporary ones.

However, the crowning glory in settlement construction is the decision to commence the building this year of 600 apartments in the build-your-own-house system. This is three times as many as the average annual construction in this system in all the development towns in the country. In Gedunim groundwork has already begun for 50 apartments under this system. According to the Housing Ministry the cost of preparing each plot will be about 500,000 Israeli pounds. Another 1 million pounds, on the average, will be given to each family as assistance--so that the budget for the build-your-own-house campaign alone will total about 1 million Israeli pounds.

The aim of the campaign and the assistance, Housing Ministry personnel say, is to reduce government expenditure, expedite construction and encourage the settlers to sell their apartments in the city to build in Judaea and Samaria. The Housing Ministry says that the scope of the build-your-own-house operation in Judaea and Samaria amounts to a revolution.

Anyone following the development of the settlements cannot but be impressed by the building momentum of the past months and by the fact that settlements which, until now, were made up of temporary construction are now striking deep roots in the soil of Judaea and Samaria.

CSO: 4805

BRIEFS

KIBBUTZ TO BE ESTABLISHED--A Hashomer Hatzza'ir [leftwing kibbutz organization affiliated to Mapam] kibbutz is apparently to be established on the Green Line in the framework of the establishment of six new settlements in Samaria. Both the kibbutz and its fields will be beyond the Green Line. The kibbutz, Ma'Anit B, is to be established on an area of 300 dunams near the village of Umm Al-Qutuf. This area is only sufficient for homes and it is not yet clear from where the land to be used for agriculture will be taken. The six new settlements will be established soon on both sides of the Green Line and will be a dense security belt of Jewish settlements separating the villages of the Israel 'triangle' from the Arab villages beyond the Green Line, in Samaria. A settlement called Barqa'i B is to be established near the village of Barta'a. This will be a community settlement, not a kibbutz. The Arabs of the 'triangle' are bitter about the feverish activity going on in their region, aimed at establishing six new settlements there. [Text] [Article by 'Amos Levav'] [TA131057 Tel Aviv MA'ARIV in Hebrew 13 Aug 80 p 3]

ISRAEL REPORTS IMMIGRATION STATISTICS--In July only about 1,922 immigrants came to Israel. Over the first 7 months of this year the number of immigrants decreased by more than 35 percent and was about 14,000. The reason for the drop in the number of immigrants is the almost hermetical closure of the gates of the Soviet Union. Our correspondent Avraham Ben-Mulekh reports that in July 1,200 people left the Soviet Union in comparison with more than 4,000 last July. Today, at a meeting of the Zionist leadership, the head of the Immigration and Absorption Department, Refa'el Kotlovitz said he was frightened about the continuation of exits. He expressed the hope that the way will soon be found to contain dropping out. [Text] [From the Evening Newsreel] [TA111740 Jerusalem Domestic Service in Hebrew 1600 GMT 11 Aug 80]

RISE IN NUMBER OF ARABS--During the first half of this year employment offices in Israel sent requests for 13,673 workers to labor offices beyond the Green Line, because of a shortage of candidates in Israel. These requests were granted. The employment offices working in the territories

are run by the military government. When the employment service in Israel is unsuccessful in fulfilling requests from Israeli citizens, it sends its requests for the recruitment of workers to those offices. The director general of the employment service, Barukh Haqla'i, said yesterday that these data are not unusual and there is a constant increase in the number of people from the territories who are working in Israel. In July 44,504 workers from the territories were employed in Israel. The employment service estimates that about 20,000 unorganized additional workers from the territories come to Israel to work each day. [Excerpt] [Article by Avraham Dishon and Nitza Aviram] [TA131040 Tel Aviv YEDI'OT AHARONOT in Hebrew 13 Aug 80 p 5]

CSO: 4805

CHAMOUN, AL-JUMAYYIL CLASH, AGREE OVER STRATEGY

Beirut AL-SAFIR in Arabic 8 Jun 80 p 15

/Article by Walid al-Nuwayhid: "Chamoun and the Phalange on the Map of Maronite Struggle"/

/Text/ In an attempt to make a comparison between the struggle between Franjiah and the Phalange and that between Chamoun and the Phalange, one must present new data within the broad framework of what each of the two struggles represents. There are people who say that contacts hedged about with secrecy have been made between former President Sulayman Franjiah and the chief of the "Lebanese Front," Camille Chamoun. It is said that the persons supervising these contacts (which could end in a bilateral meeting) are the defense secretary of the "Liberal Nationalists'" Party, Danny Chamoun, and the deputy 'Abdallah al-Rasi, son-in-law of President Franjiah. It is to be observed that these contacts occurred in a time frame leaving transformations on the Lebanese stage which could lead to a reshuffling of cards and the formulation of a kind of alliance and relations conforming to the new conditions.

In fact, President Chamoun's contacts with President Franjiah were not broken off after the Ihdin incident of 13 June 1978; although they have been much hidden and have been accompanied by many rumors and probable events, relationships have remained balanced, by virtue of the circumstances each party is experiencing in his personal relations and the conditions prevailing in the midst of the popular groups from which each derives his power.

The Two Parties' Calculations

The continued relations between the two presidents have not been remote from the calculations of either party.

President Franjiah realized that the "Lebanese Front" chief's future with the Phalange would never be better than his future with the party of Pierre al-Jumayyil. For that reason he bet on the probability of a blowup

in relations between the Liberals and the Phalange, and he was not wrong in his estimate.

President Chamoun, in turn, knows the intentions of the Phalange, which is worried about its "popularity," as a result of the growth of the Liberal Party--in view of the special weight which Chamoun accounts for with the Maronite man in the street.

In spite of the realization by both Presidents Franjiyah and Chamoun of the danger the Phalange Party and its political growth pose to their calculations, they have not given agreement to all the details for unifying their forces to confront the common danger. The failure to agree does not mean that there is any difficulty in creating common broad principles where concurrence can overcome dissension and dispute.

The Phalange, ultimately, constitutes the organized party framework under whose wings the various family, tribal and local factionalisms are combined within a greater factionalism represented by Maronite factionalism.

The success of the Phalange in the task of unifying the factionalisms and incorporating them within a unified factional framework was performed at the expense of the traditional Maronite factionalisms which were not organized within a party or system controlling the balance between the various factional tendencies.

Therefore, Franjiyah and Chamoun shared the feeling of fear of the factionalism included under the Phalange banner, but they were not united in creating effective alternatives to confront al-Jumayyil's party on the organizational and political levels.

Because of these special considerations, as well as others, relations between the three Maronite parties remained united in the framework of the structure of the "Lebanese Front" during the civil war, especially in 1976.

The Beginning of the Contradictions

However, following the entry of the Arab deterrent forces, the political and factional contradictions started to breach the unity of the "Lebanese Front" especially because of the stabilization of the political situation and fact that the danger of political victory which the joint forces had been predicted to win had ended.

During this period the Phalange and Chamoun entered into special relations with Israel, and they bl , as a result of the war in the south, which began at the al-Qulay an gap and ended with the enemy occupation of the border strip and Maj Sa'd Haddad's declaration of his "independent state."

With the expansion of the war in the south, the disputes between Franjiyah's team on the one hand and that of the Phalange and Chamoun on the other expanded.

President Franjiyah, in spite of his rigid stand against the Cairo agreement and his refusal to cooperate with the Palestinians, did, in compensation, adhere to the official Arab solution and bet on it, on grounds that it was the sole realistic guarantee for Lebanon's unity in the face of the national-Palestinian plan on the one hand and in the face of the separatist Israeli solution on the other. Meanwhile, the Chamoun-Phalange group saw in the official Arab solution an implicit aspect of the sovereignty of Arabhood in Lebanon and consequently it bet on cooperation with Israel as an instrument of deception in facing the official Arab solution on the one hand and as a special means for internationalizing the Lebanon crisis, and substituting it for all other solutions, on the other.

The Gap in the South and the Gap in the North

Thus the gap in the Lebanese south has opened a gap in the Lebanese north. Since then, all attempts to repair the rift between the traditional Maronite factionalism, whose most prominent aspects are represented by President Franjiyah, and the modern Maronite factionalism, whose most prominent instruments are represented by the Phalange Party, have failed.

Chamoun tried to rectify the situation, because he felt that the method by which the Phalange would liquidate the Liberales' Party would of necessity proceed through a blow at Franjiyah, as a basic pillar in the northern area. He proceeded to arrange the "Sayyidah Albert" conclave in 1977 to agree on a united political approach to pave the way for the forbidden.

However, all attempts ended in failure, especially when the Phalange Party brought its struggle with President Franjiyah from the political level to the military level and from the context of the "Lebanese Front" to the context of the Zagharta area.

It was not strange that the Phalange should perpetrate the Ihdin massacre just 3 months after Israel occupied the border strip in the south, as international pressure to achieve a Zionist withdrawal from Lebanese territories occupied in March 1978 were intensifying.

The massacre the Phalange perpetrated in Ihdin was tantamount to "the straw that broke the back of the camel," because, on the one hand, it shifted the Maronite factional struggles away from their peaceful context to their explosive context, and because they also occurred during a very delicate political phase, when the Phalange was exploiting the Israeli occupation and trying to use it in two directions: first, by defrauding the Arab official solution and second, by liquidating its accounts with the other Maronite factions in the desire to impose the single party's dominance over its areas.

In actuality, the Phalange did not delay long in announcing its positions, which it had harbored previously; it registered a strike against President Franjiah in 'Aqr Darah (the Zagharta area), then followed this strike with an open battle of limited objectives against the Arab deterrent forces in the eastern areas.

Thus it happened that whenever the Israeli occupation planted its feet in the southern border strip, the Phalange's attacks against the Arab deterrent forces in the eastern areas increased, with the demand that they be expelled from their centers of dominance, and the severity of the dispute with President Franjiah also expanded, with the demand that he be expelled from the sphere of Maronite jurisdiction.

While Israel covered the Phalange in its special struggles and calculations, the Phalange, in turn, covered Israel in its battles in the south and its special calculations on the regional level.

At that time, Chamoun was moving slowly in his relations with Israel and hastening to announce his opposition to the official Arab and Palestinian solution.

In spite of all these relations and struggles among the Maronite men in the street, the basic Maronite split between Chamoun and Franjiah continued. While President Franjiah was launching a campaign of political mobilization against "those dealing with Israel," and strengthening his alliance with and betting on the official Arab solution, Chamoun was justifying the alliance with Israel and launching a devastating attack against the official Arab solution.

The Relationship between the Two Factions

However, relations between the two traditional basic Maronite factions continued, in the midst of the difference in political views between Franjiah and Chamoun.

These relations constituted a sort of "political split" in the ordinary Maronite environment, since the traditional Maronite faction managed to accommodate itself to the political disputes but not to the new Phalangist faction.

Although the Chamounist Maronite faction was in agreement with the Phalange Party on the political level, the disputes and struggles spread their flames between the two parties on the ground.

Through this "Maronite rift," we can interpret and explain the continued relations between Chamoun and Franjiah and the fact that they have entered a stage of growing crisis between Chamoun and the Phalange.

The explanation of this inconsistent phenomenon may be represented by the fact that each party has hardened its factional stand.

The traditional factionalism is the fine line which joins Chamoun and Franjiah, in spite of political disputes, and the same factionalism is the combative force in confronting the modern Phalange factionalism.

This point constitutes the cornerstone for understanding the Maronite rift which exists at present. In spite of that, we consider that it is absent from the minds of some nationalist forces or that it is lost in the writings of many leftwing groups.

The absence of this point has contributed to the fact that some nationalist magazines have written analyses and articles on the disputes between Chamoun and the Phalange within the political framework in which the disputes between Franjiah and the Phalange had previously been dealt with.

In fact, a vast political gap divides the disputes between Franjiah and the Phalange on the one hand and the disputes between Chamoun and the Phalange on the other, in spite of the fact that the disputes overall hinge on the factional struggles themselves.

The Essence of the Struggle

The essence of the political struggle between the Phalange and Chamoun is not over the issue of "those dealing with Israel" and the "official Arab struggle" but over who is the main agent in the group of those who deal with Israel against the Palestinians and the official Arab solution.

It appears that Israel has chosen the Phalange Party, under the leadership of Bashir al-Jumayyil, at the expense of Camille Chamoun, chief of the "Lebanese Front."

This Israeli designation of an agent in the context of the current political map of the Arab situation has caused the Phalange's scale to tip the scale of the Maronite man in the street and consequently has caused al-Jumayyil's party to expropriate Maronite legitimacy in facing Chamoun's legitimacy, which is based on traditional factionalism.

Therefore it is wrong to compare Chamoun's disputes with the Phalange to Franjiah's disputes with the Phalange on the political level, because what draws Chamoun to the Phalange is much greater than what draws Franjiah to Chamoun.

However, when these political rifts hinge on discordant Maronite factionalisms the traditional factionalisms draw close to one another in confronting the growth and expansion of the new one, led by the Phalange Party, in

the context of a broad Israeli plan which includes the eastern region of the Arab countries.

Here, specifically, we understand the meaning and the dimensions of the "Maronite rift" in the Lebanese arena.

11887

CSO: 4802

UNIVERSITY PRESIDENT DISCUSSES VARIOUS POLICY PROBLEMS

Beirut AL-SAFIR in Arabic 7 Jun 80 p 4

/Article by Mu'tazz Maydani: "A Talk with the President of the University of Lebanon on the Present and Future: Tu'mah: The Impairment of Official Education Is a Serious Matter in Justifying Replacing It"/

/Text/ The steps the president of the Lebanese University, Dr George Tu'mah, has called for raise numerous questions among educational circles inside and outside the university which are asking about the main features of these steps, which steps can be carried out, and how they are to be carried out.

The doctoral stage has started knocking on the doors of the university-- but what doctorates? With what resources? Talk about the Faculty of Medicine prompts the question "What has become of the Faculty of Agriculture?" Will student participation in representative councils be adequately realized within the limits of Legislative Decree No 115? What is the status of political considerations in the university president's calculations? What is the truth of his view concerning the Faculties of the Media and Business Administration?

AL-SAFIR brought these and other questions to Dr Tu'mah and found him confident about the resources of the university, as represented by its professors, in a way which did not prevent him from being concerned about the development of these resources and elicited anxiety about the future of official education and warnings against attempts being made to weaken official education with the objective of prompting the citizen to seek an alternative to it, as is happening in the context of other fields.

Here is the text of the interview:

/Question/ At a session of the Deans' Council last Tuesday, you asked the deans of the university units to prepare to establish departments which would qualify students to receive doctoral degrees. Is an adequate number of professors available for a step like this, while the university

is complaining about the lack of professors to teach even at the level of the bachelor's degree in certain fields of specialization in some branches?

/Answer/ There is no reason why the doctoral stage must include all branches. The university, or the unit, gives the doctorate, and it is natural that the availability of professors for all specializations should not be at issue at the present time. However, we would have reached the stage of preparing to give the doctorate had it not been for the recent events.

If we return to the doctoral degrees which private universities in Lebanon grant, we will see that the persons supervising the theses for these degrees are from the Lebanese University for the most part, and as a consequence giving degrees is more related to people than to the administrative aspect.

We are faced with two things: first, an increase in the number of people possessing doctoral degrees from private universities, and second, the fact that this field is left to others besides the national university. This must not be allowed to continue. If we prevent these degrees from being accepted in the future, we must, in exchange, provide Lebanese with the opportunity to prepare for these degrees within the national university.

Therefore, I have appealed for a start to be made on this activity before we reach a situation where such a step would become a precipitate solution to a pressing problem instead of the focus of carefully studied planning.

Here I would like to point out that the university has professors who are internationally renowned for their scientific qualifications, whom universities abroad usually request to supervise doctoral theses or to participate in discussing them, and we must give them the opportunity to allow their national university to benefit from their resources.

Dean Dr Ahmad Makki has been assigned to prepare the statutes necessary for the doctoral stage, and I hope that he will do this in a very short time.

/Question/ Does establishment of the doctoral stage in the Lebanese University mean restricting permission for private universities to grant doctorates?

/Answer/ This is natural. As in the past, the recognition of the school diploma was discontinued after the establishment of the official diploma, the same will be the case, at the level we want for these degrees, after the doctoral stage is established in the University of the State of Lebanon. At that point we can demand that the government not recognize the degrees of private universities.

The Private Universities

/Question/ This leads us to a question on the nature of relations with private universities.

/Answer/ We honor and appreciate the private universities operating in Lebanon and are well aware of the services they have provided for this area. We sincerely extend to them the hand of cooperation, but at the same time we know that the national university must provide a full university education for all Lebanese. This is its sacred obligation and with God's permission no one will prevent us from performing our obligation.

People criticize the Lebanese University for graduating a small group of people possessing bachelor's degrees in the Humanities, but who is criticizing whom? In most cases these bachelor's degrees are degrees for job qualifications, received by people working in various sectors whom the university has allowed to try to broaden their knowledge and science. Scientific degrees are scarce because they require greater free time from the students, the numbers in the faculties of applied sciences, including the Faculty of Engineering, in which teaching has started in the best manner, are limited, and these faculties cannot in any way reduce the tremendous numbers of students in the faculties of the humanities.

Official Education

/Question/ The Lebanese University is at the apex of official education. It has a firm relationship with education in the pre-university stage. It takes students from it and in exchange provides it with professors who have graduated from it. What is the status and situation of this education, in your view?

/Answer/ Official education needs the support of all people who are sincere about their country, foremost among them the professors in official education themselves. Whatever oppression they might feel, and however they might feel that they are not receiving their just demands, the burden of concern with education remains on them.

This education has been affected in the last 5 years, as have other vital sectors in the country. Foremost in this is the internal migration of teachers, since they have been kept out of many regions while the regions which they have migrated to have not benefited from them. In spite of their excessive concentration in a specific area sometimes, they have not been able to provide education for the pupils in that area, and this may generally be attributed to the lack of sufficient school buildings fit for teaching. A large portion of these buildings were hit during the events and have not been repaired, another portion is no longer fit for use because it is along the mutual contact lines, and a portion remains occupied

by migrants. Some private schools have also been hit but the freedom of movement in the private sector has allowed these schools to regain their health quickly.

Add to all this the "revolutionary" mentality which rages in some pupils and sometimes causes them to dominate their families, teachers and friends, since they no longer have a strong incentive to learn, and to obtain degrees which are easy to get. Private schools have benefited from this situation, since they have people who protect them.

Here I would like to warn of a very serious matter, which is that to weaken official education and make it seem deficient in performing its mission will certainly lead people to think of replacing it. Therefore, one must hasten to have the official schools supported by everyone, by removing politics from them, by appointing principals who have faith in their mission toward them, by emptying them of migrants, and by repairing those of them which have been destroyed or rent out new schools.

The resources of the professors of the Lebanese University are tremendous. With their enthusiasm for raising its level, with their full time attention to it and its students, and with their unity in rebuilding Lebanon, they will show the world the true Lebanese power to stand up to difficulties.

The Representative Councils

[Question] In the plan to form representative councils, a glance was made at student participation in these councils, but, in accordance with the stipulation of Legislative Edict No 115, it is limited participation.

[Answer] We are compelled to rely on the laws which are in effect, perhaps although we do not totally believe in them, because if we do not rely on them what can we rely on? When the councils are formed they will be able to review Legislative Edicts No 122 and 115, but that must be done with extreme caution because Legislative Edict 122 is a double-edged sword.

In the draft, we have given the branch councils more powers over the subjects they are directly dealing with than others; the role of the unity council is that of a unificationist coordinating council. We have left the University Council with the powers it had.

As far as the number of University Council members goes, raising this number in the past led to a delay in the discussion of numerous matters; therefore we hope that in a council with smaller numbers that we will discuss matters where the discussion will have been made in the branch and unit councils.

As far as student participation goes, we hope that the students will conduct their elections as soon as possible, but we know that the delay in this has so far arisen from sincerity, affection and a concern for unity.

we have studied this draft at length and have set out to promulgate it from two principles: the unity of the university and the open opportunity for everyone to feel that they are participating in it equally.

In addition, the condition of election by a two-thirds majority compels everyone to form coalitions. That is not an innovation but exists in the University Law.

Politics and the University

Question: Some political forces and personalities rebuke you for not consulting with them before issuing decisions related to the appointment of directors.

Answer: We do not consult with any politician, because we want to keep academic matters within the university, in spite of all our appreciation of the politicians' role and opinions. However, if we find fault with them they hold us to account. We have the duty of preserving the sanctity of the university, and this will be achieved only through the university's complete independence of all that is foreign.

The professor demanded that a colleague intervene in a matter related to him, perhaps erroneously, or his family requested that, and I sent him a letter of censure in which I requested him to desist from this activity. I am sorry about it, but this is what happened. We hope that we will have the best relations with all bodies, but in one direction: from the university to the outside.

Media and Administration

Question: What was published, in your words, about the conditions of the faculties of the Media and Business Management, has stirred up numerous reactions; it has been said that you want to close them down. What is the truth of your position?

Answer: The two faculties have their importance, and I consider that they belong to the applied faculties. However, we must first state what is fact so that we can proceed to cope with it and remedy it and will not be accused in the future of falling short in their regard. What do these two faculties lack? They lack specialized professors who are Lebanese, are experiencing the reality we are experiencing and possess doctorates in the basic fields of specialization of each faculty. At the present time the full-time professors in each faculty are not more than 10 in number, and this is unacceptable. I know that in the field of Business Administration, even the American University has not been able to obtain professors. Why? Because a person who has obtained a higher degree in business administration and is successful in his work in the private sector will not come to the university, and consequently we are asking for professors who are like

senior, that is, who will come to us in spite of all their success in the private sector.

These two faculties were established about 10 years ago. Haven't either of them been able to send at least two students abroad for specialized study, in order to return to teach in it in the basic specializations of each?

I asked the dean of each of the two faculties: how many specialists do you have who possess doctoral degrees? Each of them answered that they had none, except for people possessing doctorates in additional fields of specialization such as economics, law, or sociology. Naturally these fields of specialization are important, but how many full-time professors with doctorates do we have in the specialized field of business administration, media, or documentation?

This is what I said. I do not belittle the value of any professor present in the two faculties. All of them, thank God, are of full value, but that is not enough—we must have a base in certain higher degrees.

What I am saying is that there is not an adequate number of professors in the faculty. The students, the journalists of the future, came to me and said, "We have studied 4 years in the faculty and have not felt that we learned anything bearing on the media. We have studied general culture, which is good, but it is not enough." The students told me this, and the dean said "We do not have professors in the basic field of specialization." I, as an official, must face this fact, and what is the solution? The solution is to send more students abroad for specialized study who will return to teach in the faculty. In fact, I will try to lower the requisite average for grants to 11 points out of 20 instead of 12, and also to send students who have graduated in previous years. What does this mean? This means that I intend to improve the situation, not close the faculty.

However, here I must wonder: how much does the Faculty of the Media cost the government? Do its graduates find opportunities to work? Is there a reason to have an independent faculty, or should it be a department in an existing faculty? This also is a question.

If we can provide money from one area and use it in another, that would be better. This year the university will pay 5 million pounds to the Faculty of the Media and Documentation in addition to the faculty's ordinary budget, in order to buy equipment. I have signed the deal, as has the minister of education, and it has now gone to the minister of finance.

[Question] It is said that you have recommendations which would lead to specialization in the media in an academic stage of 2 years following the acquisition of a bachelor's degree from a university faculty.

/Answer/ This is one recommendation which has been propounded, and the purpose of it is to improve levels. No one can call us to account for wanting to improve levels. This is our duty. However, can we apply this recommendation today? No.

In the future, when we have an adequate number of specialized people, it will be possible for us to discuss applying that, but at the present time no one can prevent us from thinking about anything whose objective is to improve levels.

This is on the one hand. On the other, if we buy the best and most advanced equipment and do not provide the necessary human personnel to operate it, what will be the result? What I have said is that before buying any machinery we must first supply the person who can run it.

This is my position, and I am answerable for it.

Here I would like to state that when I talked about the media and business administration, I was answering a question, I was not giving a lecture, as some newspapers mentioned--rather, I was presented with a question related to the university and the job areas for graduates. Usually the question is presented in a manner which imposes more on the question than it can bear.

We, as I have said, are thankful to the professors who have contracted by the hour in the Faculties of the Media and Business Administration, and we appreciate their work; were it not for them the two faculties would not have been established. However, that is not enough, since we must provide specialists possessing higher degrees who can work full time.

Full-Time Deans

/Question/ You have an intense concern for professors working full time, but there are deans who do not work full time.

/Answer/ When the period of their mission is over, we will review their status, on grounds that there is an agreement with them for a 3-year period. We cannot forget the circumstance in which they were appointed. They are capable and we hope that they will work full time in the future.

The Faculty of Agriculture

/Question/ There has been much talk about the Faculty of Medicine, while there is a faculty which has not yet "taken off," that is, the Faculty of Agriculture.

/Answer/ The coming year the Faculty of Agriculture will start its activities, God willing, after we have come up with the necessary format for it.

It will divide studies into two phases, each to consist of two academic years.

The first phase will allow students who have successfully passed the first year of the Natural Sciences Department of the Faculty of Science to enroll in the second year of the Faculty of Agriculture provided that they study some added requirements in sociology and law during that year, in addition to natural science requirements, and perform some applied activities. Then in the subsequent phase they will move on to the agricultural center which is in keeping with their specialization so that they can perform applied research and study. There is a draft in this regard which is being set out by the dean of the faculty, 'Umar 'Addadah, and Dean Nazzar Sahab, and we will hold a meeting to this end on Monday.

Northern Science

/Question/ The students in the science branch in the north are demanding that a third year be established in the department. Is there any possibility of realizing this?

/Answer/ The Dean of the Faculty of Science is the one who is concerned with this subject. However, I would like to point out here that the basic issue is professors. They are the motive force and the ones that plan for the future. The fact is that there is not an adequate number of specialized professors. Our brothers in the north believe that they are available, and as happened with business administration they sent us the names of 19 professors, just six of whom clearly met the minimum conditions.

I hope that our students in the north will also sympathize with us. Classes have been provided for the first and second years; these are witnessing a concentration of students and we can make it feasible for the students to move to Beirut. Now, if students in the final 2 years are compelled to move to Beirut and their number is much lower than those in the first and second years, this will require that attention be given to the quality of education. This quality will require buildings supplied for scientific teaching and an adequate number of specialized professors.

11867

CSO: 4802

NEW LAW RAISES PUBLIC SECTOR MINIMUM WAGE

Beirut AL-SAFIR in Arabic 11 Jun 80 p 4

/Article: "Draft Law Increasing Public Sector Wages"/

/Text/ The minister of finance, Dr 'Ali al-Khalil, has declared that the draft law to increase wages in the public sector will not be affected by the resignation of the cabinet but that the draft consists of a clause retroactive to 1 July.

The Ministry of Finance had finished preparing the draft of the law and had presented it to the Council of Ministers for discussion at the first session it was to hold.

The draft retains the percentage increase given to the private sector and has a new modification in the salary scale calling for a rise in grades. According to the draft, the minimum wages in general departments and private schools will be raised to 675 pounds per month and an increase will be given to contractors, wage earners and retired persons along with exceptional increases for contractors in private schools.

In the draft law it is stated:

Article One. The minimum wage and salary in public departments and private schools will rise to 675 pounds per month.

Article Four. People who contract with public departments and receive monthly compensation which is considered the equivalent of a wage or salary, permanent and temporary wage earners, and people who deal with the Ministry of Information but are not employees will be granted an increase equivalent to the value of the increase which has been granted in accordance with the provisions of this law to salaries of permanent employees who receive a monthly salary equal to or roughly equal to the monthly compensation of the contractors, the wages of people who deal with the ministry or 30 days' wages for the wages of wage-earners.

To calculate the value of the increase in the daily wage of wage-earners, the increase specified in the first paragraph of this article will be divided by 30.

The permanent wage earner will retain seniority qualifying for periodic raises.

On determining the daily wage, half-pound deductions will be rounded off to half pounds and deductions exceeding a half pound will be rounded out to a pound. This rule will be used in calculating periodic raises.

Retired Persons

Article Five. Retired persons will be granted raises in retirement pensions which will be determined in the following manner:

One: The pension, or the total of those of its parts and portions which range from 1 to 100 Lebanese pounds, by 100 (one hundred) percent.

Two: The pension, or the total of those of its parts and portions which range from 100.01 to 2,000 Lebanese pounds, by 20 (twenty) percent.

Three: The pension, or the total of those of its portions and parts which exceed 2,000 Lebanese pounds by 10 (ten) percent.

Four: The total increase, no matter what it may amount to, may not be less than 125 Lebanese pounds or greater than 500 Lebanese pounds.

Five: The total of these increases will be absorbed into the body of the retirement pensions.

Article Six. The pension granted to retired persons after 30 June 1980 may not be less than their pensions would have been had they been cleared on the basis of the salary series in effect as of that date, in addition to the increase stipulated in Paragraph Two of Article Six of Law No 21/79 dated 26 December 1979, which is the source of the increase which is the subject of Article 5 of this law, provided that the maximum for both increases be observed.

Paragraph Three of Article Six of Law No 21/79 mentioned above will be considered abrogated.

Private Schools

Article Seven. The salary shift which applies to members of the teaching faculties in the staffs of the Ministry of National Education and Fine Arts will apply to members of the teaching faculties belonging to the staffs of free and non-free private schools, and each of these teachers

will be classified under the new salary listed next to his old one, provided that he retain the seniority qualifying him for gradual advancement.

Article Eight. The following provisions will apply to members of teaching faculties who do not belong to the staffs of free and non-free private schools:

1. Instructors in free private schools to whom the provisions of Article Three of Law 32/65 dated 11 June 1965 apply will be granted an exceptional raise of 150 Lebanese pounds in their monthly wage and they will preserve the seniority which qualifies them for entitlement to the increase stipulated in Article Four of the abovementioned Law No 32/65.

2. Contractors who are not affected by Paragraph One of this article but to whom the provisions of the law of 15 June 1956 and modifications apply will be granted an exceptional monthly wage increase equal to the percentage increase which has occurred by virtue of the provisions of this law to the wage which belongs to the staff which is equal or nearly equal to the monthly wage of contractors, computed on the basis of their number of weekly work classes relative to the minimum teaching classes stipulated by law for the educational stage in which they work, provided that the provisions of Article 15 of the abovementioned law be observed in the event they teach in more than one stage. Here is the shift in the salary series of the general administrative staff and corresponding staffs, including counselling departments, and the salaries of Lebanese University employees who do not belong to the faculty:

Current Salary	New Salary
525	675
560	720
595	765
630	810
675	865
720	920
770	985
820	1,050
870	1,115
940	1,205
1,010	1,295
1,080	1,385
1,150	1,475
1,220	1,565
1,320	1,695
1,420	1,825
1,520	1,955
1,620	2,085
1,720	2,215
1,855	2,390
1,990	2,565

2,125	2,740
2,260	2,915
2,540	3,265
2,665	3,440
2,800	3,615
2,915	3,790
3,070	3,965
3,205	4,140

The shift in the salary series for the position of pilot in the General Civil Aviation Department:

Current Salary	New Salary
4,995	6,340
4,745	6,040
4,495	5,740
4,245	5,440
3,959	5,140
3,745	4,840

The shift in the salary series for the job of navigational mechanic in the General Civil Aviation Department:

Current Salary	New Salary
2,945	3,800
2,760	3,575
2,575	3,350
2,390	3,125
2,205	2,900
2,020	2,675

The shift in the salary series for positions in Group Five of the general administrative staff and corresponding staffs:

Current Salary	New Salary
525	675
555	715
585	755
620	800
655	845
690	890
730	935
770	985

The shift in the salary series for officers in the institutions of the Ministry of National Defense, the Secretariat General of the Supreme

Defense Council, and the internal security forces and persons in corresponding positions in public security and the Customs Control:

Current Salary	New Salary
940	1,205
1,010	1,295
1,080	1,385
1,150	1,475
1,220	1,565
1,320	1,695
1,420	1,825
1,520	1,955
1,620	2,085
1,720	2,215
1,855	2,390
1,990	2,565
2,125	2,740
2,260	2,915
2,395	3,090
2,530	3,265
2,665	3,440
2,800	3,615
2,935	3,790
3,070	3,965
3,205	4,140
3,340	4,315

The shift in the salary series for salaried persons and personnel in the institutions of the Ministry of National Defense, the Secretariat General of the Supreme Defense Council and the internal security forces and persons in corresponding positions in public security and Customs Control, except for private first class, corporal first class and qualified persons:

Current Salary	New Salary
580	745
610	785
640	825
670	865
710	915
750	965
790	1,015
830	1,065
870	1,115
910	1,165
960	1,230
1,010	1,295
1,080	1,385
1,150	1,475

1,220	1,565
1,320	1,695
1,420	1,825
1,520	1,955
1,620	2,085
1,720	2,215
1,855	2,390
1,990	2,565
2,125	2,740
2,260	2,915

The shift in salary series for privates first class and corporals first class in the organizations of the Ministry of National Defense and the Secretariat General of the Supreme Defense Council:

Current Salary	New Salary
595	765
625	805
655	845
690	890
730	940
770	990
810	1,040
850	1,090
890	1,140
935	1,195
985	1,260
1,045	1,340
1,115	1,430
1,185	1,520
1,270	1,630
1,370	1,760
1,570	2,020
1,670	2,150
1,790	2,300
1,925	2,475

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CSO: 4802

BRIEFS

SPECIAL ARAB AID FUND--At the meeting it held the day before yesterday, the Council of Ministers agreed to a decree calling for the opening of a special account in the name of Arab aid to Lebanon in the trustee accounts of the treasury. Half this aid is to be deposited in an independent account for expenditures in the south and the other half in a deposit for expenditures in the other areas of Lebanon. Herewith follows the text of the resolution and determining conditions: "The aid which it was decided to present to Lebanon at the Tunis conference held November 1979 has subsequently begun to come in, since some Arab countries have sent some of it and deposited it in the current treasury account in Lebanese currency in the Bank of Lebanon and other countries are in the process of sending the sums involved. It is therefore recommended, for the sake of determining the bases for depositing this aid and the manner whereby it will be allocated in a manner according with the legal provisions in effect, that the following principles be observed: 1. A special account will be opened with the trustee accounts of the treasury to be called 'Arab aid to Lebanon--Summit Conference in Tunisia.' All the funds will be entered into this which come to us in implementation of the resolutions of the Summit Conference in Tunis. Half this sum will be deposited in an independent account to be spent in the south and the other half in an account to be spent on the other areas of Lebanon. 2. When it is desired to allocate these funds and determine the way in which they are spent, a decree will be issued which will be adopted by the Council of Ministers with reliance on Article 52 of the Public Accounting Law, entering the sums to be allotted in the revenue section of the budget, while credits to that amount are opened in the expenditures section of the same decree." /Text/ /Beirut AL-SAFIR in Arabic 9 Jan 80 p 5/ 11887

CSO: 4802

LIBYA

BRIEFS

THREATS OF OIL WEAPON--Paris, KUWAIT NEWS AGENCY--In a television interv. / Colonel Mu'ammarr Al-Qadhdhafi said "Libya is still thinking of using the oil weapon against the United States." He said in the interview report broadcast here today that Libya has not discounted the possibility of threatening the United States by [withholding] oil as a reaction to its support of Israel. However he did not specify a probable time for effecting this idea which he first proposed last year. He said that he did not personally have any connection with the "purification campaign" [of assassination] against dissident Libyans living abroad. He said that he was opposed to this bodily purgation and he called for the proclamation of a proper punishment of those people by the Libyan Peoples' Courts. Qadhdhafi called the news that Libya was trying to obtain nuclear weapons and that Pakistan was assisting him to build a nuclear bomb a lie. He said: "We are opposed to nuclear arms and on this basis we have signed all of the special treaties governing the spread of nuclear weapons." He characterized Libyan relations with the Soviet Union as politically amicable. He said that these ties are accountable for the well-being of the Libyan people. Qadhdhafi added that relations with France and his country were good currently but he added the sole point of contention between them was France's policy of colonialism in Africa as he put it. [Text] [Riyad AL-RIYADH in Arabic 30 Jul 80 p 14]

CSO: 4802

NEW PRESIDENT PURSUES YEMENI UNITY, CONTACTS WITH SAUDIS, LIBYANS

London AL-HAWADITH in Arabic 23 May 80 p 21

[Article by Farid al-Khatib: "'Ali Nasir Muhammad Refuses To Be an Interim President, and Adopts a Policy of Avoiding Isolation or Conformity"]

[Text] An Arab personality who recently returned from a visit to Aden said that Former South Yemeni President 'Abd-al-Fattah Isma'il is expected to attend a ceremony in his honor to be held on the occasion of his receiving the 14 October medal. It was granted to him after he resigned as president and was nominated as head of the ruling Socialist Party. He is also expected to deliver a speech at the above-mentioned ceremony, which will take place before this issue of AL-HAWADITH comes out.

It appears that Former President Isma'il is still living at his home in the al-Ma'ashir area of the South Yemeni capital, enjoying the formalities of a guard and the companions he had in the past. His contacts with officials of the state, which enjoys a strategic position on the Straits of Hormuz between the Indian Ocean and the Red Sea, have not been severed. In this respect, his situation is not appreciably worse than that of Former Iraqi President Ahmad Hasan al-Bakr. It should be mentioned that in an earlier press interview, his successor, President 'Ali Nasir Muhammad, described him as "a brother and a comrade in the struggle."

At the same time, it is difficult to predict the actual role which the new president might play, and one cannot speak of any hostility on the part of the successor towards the predecessor, especially since Isma'il was the "supervisor and principal political decision-maker" during the twistings and turnings through which the South Yemeni regime has passed, while Muhammad carried out the decisions.

Observers, who consider Defense Minister 'Ali 'Antar the "fulcrum" in the political balance which was established when the new president took power, may be basing their reports more on his position than on inside information. Inside information indicates that 'Antar does not aspire to be Number One Man, and that there is no divergence between his political inclinations and the present situation. As for the new president, he had also previously held the post of defense minister for 8 years.

The recent visit to Aden by North Yemeni Prime Minister 'Abd-al-'Aziz 'Abd-al-Qaasi, the first of its kind since 1967, the year South Yemen became independent from the British mandate, at the head of a 6-man delegation the most important member of which was Foreign Minister Hasan Makki, resulted in an agreement to establish joint economic projects and to coordinate development plans between both parts of Yemen, as indicated in the joint statement issued by the two parties. The visit also resulted in an agreement to achieve unity between the two countries "in peace and democracy on the road to social progress." Secretary of the Central Committee of the Yemeni Socialist Party 'Abd-al-'Aziz 'Abd-al-Wali, who visited Beirut recently, described it as evidence of the fact that relations between the two sides are "better than they have been at any time past."

AL-HAWADITH has learned that during the North Yemeni prime minister's visit, during which popular receptions were held for him, Aden officials appealed to him to implement the agreement which North Yemeni President 'Ali 'Abdallah Salih had concluded with the "National Democratic Front" led by Sultan 'Umar. They expressed a strong desire that relations with the north be managed peacefully and improved, inasmuch as any reversal in those relations would be to the detriment of both countries.

During the visit of Saudi Deputy Foreign Minister Shaykh 'Abd-al-'Aziz al-Thaghiyan, which was the first of its type since 1977, a letter from King Khalid to President Muhammad was delivered, which contained a positive response to the request to establish good-neighbor relations between South Yemen and Saudi Arabia, in addition to an invitation from the king to the new president to visit Saudi Arabia.

President Muhammad accepted the invitation, but he has not yet set a date for it. Information media guesses as to the date of this visit have come to nothing, and the new South Yemeni president's visit to Saudi Arabia will most likely be part of a tour including North Yemen and the Arab Gulf states, particularly Kuwait and the UAE.

The Arab states have made intensive contacts with Aden. Some observers describe this as an Arab "offensive" to explore the dimensions of change in the presidency, in the hope that there will be a tendency towards moderation and that these contacts will help achieve this moderation. But in this respect, new President Muhammad has apparently decided to follow a delicate course, one of not reacting to the Arab offensive through isolation or conformity.

It appears that the new Aden president is determined to preserve his country's role in the Steadfastness Front, which includes Syria, Algeria and Libya as well as the PLO. In fact, during his visit to Aden, the North Yemeni prime minister announced that his country supports the recent resolutions of the Steadfastness Front's Tripoli summit.

It seems that Libya wants to entice Aden into establishing special relations with it, especially by means of Defense Minister 'Ali 'Antar, who visited Libya for 24 hours earlier this month, carrying a letter from his president

to Col Mu'ammarr al-Qadhafi, and Former Interior Minister Salih Muslim. In the past, these two men had represented a "natural yet temperamental" channel of communication between their country and Libya.

Maj 'Abd-al-Salam Jallud had visited Aden after visiting San'a', and some news reports said that this visit was intended to speed up the unification of the two countries, especially since the Tripoli agreement constitutes one of the unity agreements between the two sides. But informed sources described the Aden visit of Jallud, who spoke at Labor Day celebrations during his visit, as a visit of "lectures, not financial aid."

At the same time, the new president seems to be resolute on the subject of his country's relations with the Soviet Union, which he described as "strategic" at his press conference. He recently dispatched three members of the political bureau of the ruling party to carry letters to Moscow and socialist camp capitals.

It is a fact that South Yemen is a poor country with limited resources. Industry, once established, needs to "import plants and raw materials, as well as purchasing power," as one observer remarked. Also, arable land is limited. The greater part of Soviet aid goes to the army for weapons. There has been information indicating that tribal relations still exist within the army, and that the army's transformation into an ideological army is just about complete.

Will the pendulum come to rest in Aden? Or will it continue to move from right to left, awaiting the chimes of zero hour?

An Arab personality who returned recently from Aden says that the new republican president is "the key man, not an interim man behind whom stands a strong man," and that he enjoys unanimous support. At the same time, the situation in South Yemen is not heading towards a struggle of liquidation. As to the former president, whom some observers think may return to power on the crest of a radical leftist coup, the Arab personality said, "He has taken a realistic attitude towards the actual situation."

Nonetheless, there has been some activity on the Palestinian scene which is tantamount to a reaction to the change which occurred in Aden last month and which can shed light on its nature: Secretary General of the Democratic Front Nayif Hawatimah is not pleased with that change, although Secretary General of the Popular Front Dr George Habash is enthusiastic about it. Rather than travel to Aden to negotiate with officials about the new situation, Hawatimah sent his deputy, PLO Executive Committee Member Yasir 'Abd-Rabbuh, to do so, while he himself left for a trip including Vietnam and Cambodia.

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BRIEFS

NEW ENGINEERING COLLEGE--Qatar University's college of engineering will be opened at the start of the coming school year, as was announced by an official source at the university, who said that the college will have four sections: mechanical, civil, electrical and chemical engineering. The idea of establishing the college dates back to 1974, at which time a technical committee of international specialists was formed which began studying the country's need for these specializations. It is worth mentioning that the final specifications for the new laboratories in the permanent building and for the required equipment have been prepared, and the details for the first and second years' curricula have been drawn up. They will be taught by professors from the university's college of sciences; in addition, aid will be sought from professors at other Arab and foreign engineering colleges. The new college will start out in the temporary building until the permanent building is finished in 1982. The study halls and necessary laboratories have been set up. It is envisaged that the university's new buildings will have closed-circuit television to provide instructional service for the various sections, as well as an audio-visual section and a section for exhibits, conferences and student activities. [Text] [Doha AL-'URUBAH in Arabic 29 May 80 p 7] 8559

CSU: 4802

SAUDI ARABIA

UNREST IN EASTERN PROVINCE REPORTED

GF301530 Tehran International Service in Arabic 1500 GMT 30 Jul 80

[Text] In its issue today, the Lebanese newspaper AL-NIDA', citing informed Arab sources, says political prisoners in Eastern Saudi Arabia--and there are reportedly hundreds of them--have begun a 1-week hunger strike. They are calling for the fulfillment of their demands, which have also been made by the masses in the region. The sources say: the mass movement in Saudi Arabia is clashing with the regime's forces. The clashes have resulted in the burning of cars belonging to police and the intelligence service.

The sources add: the gravity of the situation in Eastern Saudi Arabia is demonstrated by the fact that soldiers have disappeared from the streets and are seen patrolling only in groups. Authorities are establishing camps for guards between Shihah and 'Amath.

The sources add: Saudi authorities are especially apprehensive about the possibility of mass action on 19 and 21 Ramadan [31 July and 2 August], the anniversary of the wounding and martyrdom of Imam 'Ali, may peace be upon him.

Citing the same sources on relations within the Saudi royal family, AL-NIDA' says that about 6 weeks ago differences between the conflicting wings of the family heightened and culminated in an agreement on the resignation of King Khalid, with Prince Fahd assuming power and Prince 'Abdallah becoming crown prince. However, differences over the command of the national guard thwarted the agreement. Prince 'Abdallah refused to forfeit his command of the national guard and insisted on retaining it in addition to being crown prince and deputy prime minister.

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MOROCCO, POLISARIO SAID TO BE SEEKING NEW ALLIES

Nairobi THE WEEKLY REVIEW in English 1 Aug 80 p 30

[Text]

ALTHOUGH Morocco is still far from establishing unchallenged control in Western Sahara, King Hassan is clearly exhilarated by the results of this year's Organisation of African Unity (OAU) when he managed to rally enough support to block the application of the Polisario's Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic to the OAU membership. But he also appears not to have forgotten that the war is not yet won. Last week he despatched crown prince Sidi Mohammed around to the capitals of the countries that supported the Moroccan cause to give them his big 'thank you', to keep their support going. Mohammed visited Senegal, Guinea, Ivory Coast, Cameroun and Zaïre. Although these countries were a minority at the OAU summit, they were able to dictate the outcome on the issue when they threatened to walk out of the continental organisation if the Sahrawi Republic was admitted as a member. To avoid a split in the organisation, the other members agreed to put off a decision.

But while Mohammed was conferring with Morocco's faithful friends, the Polisario was out widening the number of nations that recognise it. Interestingly, it is also using a few arm-twisting tricks of its own, just as Morocco has been using its strategic position and phosphates to rally support for its cause. While recognition has come from countries strung over a number of

continents, no country from Western Europe has given recognition to the Sahrawi Republic. The most it has been able to get was the recognition by Spain's ruling party for the Polisario on a party-to-party basis.

The desert war between Morocco and the Polisario has occasionally spilt onto the Atlantic Ocean, especially the rich fishing ground off the coast of Western Sahara, where each side has tried to stake the right of determining who fishes there. On June 4 a Polisario column raided the continental shelf and was able to capture 15 Portuguese fishermen for what it regards as illegal fishing. After destroying their trawler, *Rio Kouga*, it took them to its camps as prisoners. In Lisbon the Portuguese government found itself under pressure to negotiate the release of the fishermen or face a potentially explosive industrial action from the nation's fishing industry. It sent a special envoy, Louis Fontura, to Algiers for negotiations with the Polisario in a bid to free the fishermen. The Polisario had only one condition. That Portugal recognise the Sahrawi Republic. Portugal, on the other hand, did not appear to be inflexible. And on Wednesday, last week, agreement had been reached for the freeing of the fishermen. The two sides signed a communique which expressed "Portugal's support for the right of the Saharan people to self-dete-

mination, to independence, to sovereignty and to the territorial integrity of their country under the direction of their sole and legitimate representative, the Polisario Front."

The Portugues side however tried to climb down from the position taken in Algiers. The fishermen arrived in Lisbon, and Portugues foreign minister Diogo Freitas do Amaral denied on television that his country had recognised the Polisario's provisional government in Western Sahara. He said that the Algiers communique "went beyond, on certain points and in the way it was phrased, the position of the government

in Lisbon." But he did admit that Portugal had agreed to make a declaration favouring self-determination for the people of the territory. The polisario seemed little troubled by the apparent attempt by Lisbon to backpedal on its position. It maintained that it had no other reaction that to cite the communique "which is perfectly clear." Even without the communique, the fact that negotiations took place between official representatives of Portugal and the Sahrawi Republic, itself constituted implicit recognition of the Sahrawi government's sovereignty, according to many observers. ■

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